PAF s’ Air War Plan June 1965

                                            (painting by Rehan Siraj)

Basic Philosophy of Air Defence of Pakistan:-

Since its incorporation, The Pakistan Air Force was a small size tactical Air Force and was geared for its paramount mission in terms of defensive and offensive operations be used to deny the numerically superior enemy Air Forces the free utilization of Pakistan s’ air space and as well to safeguard the country s’ strategic military and economic assets and infrastructure, including the Air Force s’ own aircraft , air bases, ADGE s’ radars from destruction at the hands of superior enemy Air Force.

The offensive mission in the first phase at the outset of hostilities was to attack the superior enemy Air Force s’ air bases, destroying as many enemy aircraft and air base infrastructure, including air base installations, radars and other facilities of POL & ammunition dumps etc. Such offensive operation would not only reduce the pressure on Pakistan s’ Air Defences; but it would also greatly facilitate the achievement of the over all control of the air space, with out which the Air Force s’ Army and Navy support operations could effectively be jeopardized by the superior enemy Air Force.

The Air War Plan was resulted from the fundamental school of thought crystallized along with final analysis contemplated by Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan Commander-in-Chief, PAF and his staff on the employment of the Air Force in the air defense battle for Pakistan in June 1962., Which was later updated and finalized on June 1965 after operation desert hawk during Rann of Kutch military duel between Indian and Pakistan Armies in the desert.

Strategic Background:-


Since 15th August, 1947., The paramount mission of the Royal Pakistan Air Force had been established by its High Command to achieve a high degree of air superiority at the outset of the war with enemy air force through Counter Air Operation.

Every Air Chief of the PAF has maintained its paramount mission with spirit and letter. Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley s’ first message delivered to the Air Force, while taking over the command of Royal Pakistan Air Force on 19th February 1949., reflected a thorough professional approach, defining its milestone. ”The sole preoccupation of every individual in this Air Force, No matter in what sphere of activity he finds himself, is to keep our aircraft flying, ready to fight, equipped and trained for war, down to the last detail.”

While, Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley releasing strategic cardinal policy for air defence of Pakistan stated, “that the Air Force take on enemy Air Force, then try to isolate the battlefield and after that give direct support to the ground forces”.

The Royal Pakistan Air Force s’ Air Headquarters directive No 11 issued in April 1949, which declared:-

“In air strategy initiative is a prerequisite to air superiority: in air tactics, it’s the key to victory.”

The air superiority proved to be a prerequisite to any successful surface military campaign in sea or at land. No operational mission, not even the routine movement of troops or logistics, was possible with out first achieving favourable air superiority by the Air Force.

The concept dates back Spain s’ Civil War of 1936. The German Luftwaffe s’ Condor legion sank a number of Republican ships, and they developed effective tactical procedure for integrating air operations with the artillery fire and movement of General Franco s’ ground forces.

The concept of air superiority was described by Prime Minister of the Britain, Sir Winston Churchill during the Second World War. “The only security upon which sound military principles will rely is that you should be master of your own air.”

The concept of air superiority and its object, scope and operational methodology in terms of tactical and strategic air operations has adequately demonstrated its track record during World War-II, Korean War and Arab Israel Wars.

Apart from above wars, during the first Indo-Pak military conflict on account of Kashmir valley. The Indian Army units led by Col. Sam Manekshaw (Later Chief of Army Staff & Field Marshal) pre empted to start landing in the Kashmir valley through massive air lift and air support sorties rendered by the Indian Air Force at 9.30 am on 27th October 1947. The Indian Air Force s’ Dakota DC-3s along 100 Dakotas from Air Lines successfully undertook the uphill task under the command of Air Commodore Baba Mehar Singh.

The PAF was severely handicapped, with only 16 Tempests on its inventory against the IAF s’ 68. Furthermore, The Government of Pakistan had prohibited its battle employment in order to avoid a full scale air war with India. Whereas, IAF s’ Tempests fighter aircraft enjoyed complete freedom of action to carry out hit and run air raids against mujahideen lashkars operating around Srinagar and valley. The Indian Army could successfully hold the battle ground to ward off mujahideen s’ guerilla warfare offensive operations by capturing Srinagar through the active and dynamic air support operations/sorties carried out by the Indian Air Force. During Poonch & Ladakh/Leh operations, The tactical utilization of the Air Force on mountain range and its valleys turned tide in favour of invading Army.

Whereas the Pak Army High Command and Army Generals of the early 50s perhaps found it difficult to understand what this new concept of air superiority was all about. Even C-in-C, Pak Army, General Douglas Gracey tried to advocate the “Air Support Vs Air Superiority” school of thought among sister services in his arbitrary and arrogant style, Without acknowledging the historical significance of Air Superioriy through Counter Air Operation with recent proven track records in Battle of Britain,Japanese Navy s' pre emptive air strikes on Pearl Harbour/Hawai US Naval Complex,Battle of Midway and World War-II.

Gracey would be remembered in our National History, who defaulted to comply the legitimate & constitutional orders issued by Governor General Pakistan Muhammah Ali Jinnah to launch attack in Kasmir to counter Indian military operations there on 26th October ,1947., leaving behind an abject disgrace to be followed by others.

General Gracey distributed a paper under title “ First Lesson from Korea” to various formations of the Pakistan Army and a copy endorsed to the C-in-C, RPAF, outlining the proposed Air Support role of the Air Force dated 29th August, 1950.

“The small Pakistan Air Force should be trained primarily for tactical support of the Pakistan Army and the Navy, and be equipped to carry out this task with suitable aircraft. Army & Air Force and Navy & Air Force cooperation must be perfected, especially as regard air reconnaissance, the production of air photos and the direct support of the Army in conjunction with artillery in the destruction of enemy tanks. The indirect tactical support of the Army by air attacks on enemy ammunition, POL and supply convoys should be studied.”

Where as mentioned earlier, Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley the Commander in Chief of the Royal Pakistan Air Force had been firm conviction on a graduated approach by the Air Force during the battle week, Because no military operation in modern warfare can succeed with out prior attainment of a favourable air situation.

Later on the Concept of the Joint Operations & Planning between the Army and the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy could not get any practical shape at GHQ s' level, because Military ruler General Ayub Khan and his loyal C-in-C of the Army General Musa Khan had not acknowledged the paramount significance of the Air Force and the Navy for the defence of the country and thereby had been considering the Air Force as an extension of the artillery and the army due to their poor military vision and very limited elementary knowledge of strategy and tactics. Although the country was divided geographically among two parts West and East connecting through sea lanes via Indian Ocean & aerial route overflying archrival India,the Pakistan Navy was also getting lowest priority as per defence policy of the government of Pakistan, which was basically army dominated due to General Ayub Khan s' military rule in the country.

That s' why, these incompetent & mediocre Army Generals commanding the best professional army of Pakistan could not visualized the strategic role of the PAF under the air war strategy, its operational & tactical capabilities as well as limitations Vs numerically superior enemy the IAF anticipating future military conflicts between India and Pakistan on Kashmir s' core issue.

Meanwhile, PAF s' chief Air Marshal Asghar Khan tried to convince his counterpart General Musa Khan and President General Ayub Khan about the concept & operational methodology of the Joint Operations & Planning, but could not achieve any breakthrough and the Pakistan Army High Command remained engaged in its war planning in isolation from the Air Force and the Navy. Whereas, effective inter services co-operation between the air force, the navy and the army can grow only out of mutual trust and complete understanding of each other operational capabilities and limitations, which totally was lacked on part of the army !

“Air Superiority” The Strategic Milestone of PAF:-

Later on in subsequent years during sixties the controversy about air superiority vs air support continued, while the PAF was setting its course on the path of supersonic jet technology transformation in line with USAF s’ globally acknowledged professional standards. Air Marshal Asghar Khan being a very visionary strategist and Commander in Chief , Pakistan Air Force strongly advocated the case of Air Force before army dominated school of thought and hierarchy clearly stating that:

“PAF must first achieve a high degree of air superiority over the land battle areas, and it must be equipped to do this effectively.”

That s’ why Air Superiority through Counter Air Operation has been the Strategic Milestone of PAF Air War Strategy since August 1947.

Geo-Political & Strategic Factors:-

Since the time of independence, Air Force High Command kept assuming that the PAF would be fighting the numerically superior, highly trained enemy Air Force. Therefore, Air Force hierarchy wanted to raised and maintained a highly trained, motivated and professional Air Force that could destroy any enemy numerically superior Air Force that might deployed against Pakistan and which could render adequate air support to Army ground forces.

The Indian Government after humiliating military defeat of Indian Army by the Chinese Army during mountainous battles at Ladakh & NEFA in 1962 , launched a gigantic program to expand the size of the Indian Air Force. The IAF s’ strength was planned to increased from 28,000 personnel in 1962 to 100,000 personnel by 1964 and A large number of new fighter bombers squadrons and wings were planned to raised in the Air Force. An emerging sign of formidable air power threat in the future conflict with India.

The Indian Army s’ Rann of Kutch venture against Pakistan Army also turned out to be another fiasco. Soon after Kutch debacle in the desert, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bhadur Shastri announced his war agenda “India will choose a front of her own choice.” While another military encounter with China was considered a very remote chance, Pakistan would be the ultimate target of Indian Strategic designs at large, a clear writing was on the wall!

As another war was imminent on account of Kashmir s’ issue with India, Western and Eastern Punjab would be the centre of gravity during the Indo-Pak conflict. Any political venture will open the flood gates of the war. The main battle for Pakistan would be fought in the lands of Punjab and Kashmir. More over the next war would be a matter of survival for Pakistan and the Air Force was supposed to put most decisive contribution for the next Indo-Pak war on Kashmir.

The IAF s' numerical superiority in terms of air war machines & infrastructure as a consequence,these two major factors were cardinal in designing the PAF s' Air War Plan June, 1965:-

A. That the IAF s'operational assests must be attacked at its bases to reduce its numerically superiority, thereby creating an equitable balance of air power.

B. That the IAF can not be allowed the luxury of a surprise air attack,because that could render the PAF ineffective and the skies would be under enemy s' air control, leaving the army and the navy at its mercy.

Consequently, the PAF high command needed to contemplate tactically offensive deployment. Pre-Emption was therefore, to be an imperative for the PAF, rather a mere contigency plan.

Strategic Mission:-

The ultimate milestone of the PAF was to neutralize selected very vital elements of the Indian Air Force by undertaking massive pre-emptive air strikes in strength against them in order to reduce the margin of superiority of the IAF, Thereby preventing it from gaining air superiority in air battle against PAF and as well effectively providing air support missions for Pakistan Army in the land battles.

The Counter Air Operation :-

When numerical superiority was heavily tilted in favour of the Indian Air Force. A bold and meticulous operational plan envisaged initiative on the outbreak of Indo-Pak war by launching sustained and wide spread pre-emptive air strikes/ sorties after sorties by the PAF over the enemy air bases, radars and military targets, would ultimately bottle up major portion of the enemy Air Force in defensive posture and in doing so also to ensure PAF s’ operational employment for any subsequent land-air operations.

The strategic mission of the PAF was to achieve a high degree of air superiority through counter air operation at the outset of the war. It was a firm determination on the part that found the Air Force getting ever ready and able to decisively achieve air superiority in the first two days of the 1965 war.

The Anti Surface Force Operation:-

Primarily, No air support plans for the Pakistan Army had at all intended to be set aside during the preliminary rounds of the air battle with IAF. Over the just past twelve months the Air Headquarters had however, came to appreciate a possible requirement by the Army for direct air support from the very outset of hostilities. An up date feature of the plan was that a fighter bomber wing of F-86s was earmarked for the air support missions.

Rann of Kutch:-

On 5thApril,1965 The Indian Army set out to capture the disputed Rann of Kutch territory by launching three infantry brigades. The Pakistan Army took precaution of moving into an area between Chaad Bet and Biar Bet, to prevent the Indian forces from attempting the complete military occupation of Rann. The limited scale Rann of Kutch military duel between Indian and Pakistan Armies provided an opportunity to the Air Force to test and up date its air war planning and operational preparations accordingly.

Although the Air Force was not called upon to actively join the Kutch operations, but it was fully mobilized to face the eventual threat from enemy. In the light of the armed flare up in the area, The PAF s’ High Command swiftly made operational preparations to react immediately, assuming that the enemy Air Force could have committed to battle operations.

The Air Force red alert directly concerned two major air bases-Mauripur was to cover the Rann of Kutch in the south and Sargodha was to keep an eye on the IAF line up at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara in the north.

The Indian Air Force had deployed following Squadrons operating from southern sector at :-

A. Jamnagar air base

One Fighter Recce Squadron

One Fighter Bomber Squadron

One Canberra Bomber Squadron

One Gnat Fighter Detachment

B. Poona air base

One Maritime Recce Squadron

Two Vampire Fighter Squadrons

One Canberra Bomber Squadron

However, The Pakistan Air Force deployment in the southern sector enjoyed qualitative edge considered to be a fair match for the numerically superior enemy air force.

Operation Desert Hawk:-

Under the operational command order issued by the Air Force Headquarters code name “Desert Hawk” Mauripur air base, located near Karachi, had assumed its full war status and was ready for any eventuality that might emerge. Since April 8th 1965 all operational aircraft at both the air bases were ordered to operate from wartime dispersals in combat readiness and their operations rooms like the air defence operations centre at air headquarters were to be manned round the clock. The following operational steps reflected its state of readiness:-

Operational Profile:-

1. Four F-86s and four F-104s armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) were shifted from Sargodha air base and deployed at Mauripur air base for air defence missions.

2. Six F-86s & two B-57s operating from Mauripur air base were kept at one hour readiness for close support or strike missions if required.

3. Ack Ack batteries were placed to their war time locations for the defence of the air bases.

4. All F-86 s’ pilots, including undergoing training and staff courses, were recalled for active duties.

5. Group Captain Bukhari was attached to GHQ, Rawalpindi and Squadron Leader S.A.Changezi was attached to HQ 8th Division, Hyderabad to act as liaison officers.

6. Radars/Mobile observer units were deployed to war time locations.

7. Ground Combateer units were deployed at Mauripur air base and Early Warning & GCI Radar station at Badin for close range defence of installations.

8. The PAF was brought to at higher degree of readiness to timely counter the hostile designs of enemy air force.

Hot line communications:-

Meanwhile during the Rann of Kutch skirmishes, Air Marshal M Asghar Khan, Commander-in Chief Pakistan Air Force contacted his counter part in the Indian Air Force telling Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh that it would be prudent to have an agreement of keeping both the Air Forces away from local conflict of Rann because, if the IAF attacked the Pakistan Army in the Rann of Kutch areas, the PAF would feel free to retaliate any where and in any manner it saw fit, and this could lead to an immediate escalation of the local conflict beyond predictable dimensions.

Although IAF s’ Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh could hardly be expected to give a positive response to such a proposal, he clearly heeded the implied threat; the Indian Air Force did indeed stay away from the Rann of Kutch battle areas and this proved to be of great advantage to the Pakistan Army s’ military duel with Indian Army.

Wing Commander Zulfiqar Ali Khan (Later Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal) was Air Adviser to the High Commission for Pakistan in New Delhi, India, reported in a letter to C-in-C PAF dated 19th April 1965, that the IAF s’ High Command was disturbed over the PAF s’ requirement of keeping the air above the disputed area clear of all aerial activities. He wrote ,”They (the IAF senior officers) were visibly disturbed at the receipt of your message. Air Marshal M. M. Engineer wanted to know if IAF s’ Transport or Helicopter aircraft could go on supply missions to Indian Army posts in the area. I replied that we would consider any Indian aircraft entering disputed territory as violation of our air space.”

The Air Adviser further stated, ”I was asked if we were going to use fighter aircraft to stop air supply missions to Indian Army posts.”

At the same time, Air Headquarters sensing hostile air threat from enemy s’ Air Force in the southern sector; acted imaginatively, issued Command Orders that were flashed for hot scramble of PAF interceptor fighters in the event of an IAF aircraft crossing into Pakistan territory.

“The Indian fighter bomber aircraft were to be shot down with in 10 nautical miles into Pakistan territory; However military transport aircraft were to be forced down at the nearest PAF air bases around Karachi.”

First IAF s’ fighter aircraft forced down by F-86s:-

An IAF fighter crossed the international border near Rann of Kutch and set its course towards PAF s’ Early Warning & Ground Controlled Interception Radar network at Badin on 24th June, 1965.

An unexpected track appeared over the radar scopes in and around Badin. A command order was flashed to Mauripur air base to “scramble” F-86s. An ever vigilant F-86s pair scrambled from air base to intercept the enemy fighter. The Ground Controlled Interception Radar vectored F-86s pair towards Badin areas. Finally, the PAF s’ F-86s had successfully forced down IAF Ouragan fighter aircraft from 51 Auxiliary Squadron operating from IAF Jamnagar, which was on an aerial reconnaissance mission over Badin.

Indian pilot Flt.Lt. Rana Lal Chand got released on the occasion of 14th August Independence day by the Government of Pakistan.

The Rann of Kutch emergency period was very efficiently handled through operation Desert Hawk by Air Marshal M Asghar Khan, Commander-in Chief Pakistan Air Force and his air staff including Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) Air Commodore Rahim Khan and Director Operations Group Captain Zafar Chaudhry. Although the operational exercise proved to be the curtain raiser to the September war with India.

Whereas the PAF stood guard during the emergency period of operation “Desert Hawk”, Air Headquarters finalized and issued “ Air War Plan” on June 29, 1965 to all units,squadrons,wings,bases & commands.

Air War Plan of June , 1965:-

The Air Strategy of the Air War Plan of June , 1965. was worked for Counter Air Operations on top most priority and then undertaking Anti Surface Force Operations in the gradual phase of the air battle of Pakistan, Sargodha and Peshawar were to be the two major operational nucleolus for air war operations against India posing direct threat to major air bases of the IAF.

Sargodha air base operating , in conjunction with high powered Early Warning & Ground Controlled Interception radars system at Sakesar was the major centre of the PAF s’ entire air defence network in the northern and western sectors. However, Size of the force and lack of material resources prohibited any large scale dispersal of the PAF and denied to it much of the flexibility needed for its air operations.

Peshawar air base a bomber wing nucleolus was planned to deploy and to operate B-57s bomber wing for major night bombing operations along with Risalpur air base, using Samungali air base as stand by junction for rearming and refueling the bomber formations.

Offensive Counter Air Operation & Air Strike Missions Profile :-

The Air Force s’ original counter air /air strike plan therefore covered the entire string of IAF s’ air bases from Srinagar in the north up to Jamnagar in the south, along with Western borders with India.

The depth of the air strikes, dependent mainly on the radius of action at tree top level to avoid enemy radar‘s detection, extended up to Ambala air base in the case of aircraft operating from West Pakistan, and to Kalaikunda air base near Calcutta for aircraft operating from Dacca in East Pakistan.

IAF Battle Deployment before 1965 War:-

Whereas, numerically superior Indian Air Force faced no such limitations and operational constraints. The formidable fighter bomber force deployed at Pathankot, Adampur, Ambala,Agra and Halwara, the availability of large immediate reserves and the flexible choice of air operations from any number of integrated jet air bases, provided them a superiority and dynamic advantage in any course of action they wished to follow.

Mysteres:

No. 1 Sqn

No. 3 Sqn

No. 8 Sqn

No. 31 Sqn

No. 32 Sqn

Hunters:

No. 7 Sqn

No. 27 Sqn

No. 20 Sqn

No. 14 Sqn (East)

No. 17 Sqn (East)

No. 37 Sqn (East)

Gnats:

No. 2 Sqn

No. 9 Sqn

No. 23 Sqn

Canberra:

No. 5 Sqn

No. 16 Sqn (East)

No. 35 Sqn

No. 106 SPR Sqn

Jet Bomber Conversion Unit Other Types:

No. 28 Sqn - MiG-21

No. 45/220 Sqn - Vampire

No. 24 Sqn - Vampire (East)

No. 4 Sqn - Ouragan (East)

• IAF Western Air Command ( Air Vice Marshal R. Rajaram)

o Pathankot (Gp. Capt. Roshan Suri)

 No.28 MiG-21 (Small Dett: 2) (Wg. Cdr. MSD Wollen) >>> Moved to Adampur

 No.45/No.220 Vampire (Sqn. Ldr. SK Dahar) >>> Moved to Hindon

 No.3 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. Paul Ruby)

 No.31 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. WM Goodman)

 No.23 Gnat (Dett: 8 under S/L J W Greene)

o Halwara (Gp. Capt. GKK John)

 No.7 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. ATRH Zachariah)

 No.27 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. Jog)

 No.20 Hunter (Dett: 4-6 under S/L B K Bishnoi att to No.7 Later)

 No.2 Gnat (Dett: 4 under S/L R Dhawan - Later W/C Bharat Singh)

o Adampur (Gp. Capt. WVA Lloyd)

 No.1 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. OP Taneja)

 No.8 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. Milikins)

 No.28 MiG-21 (Dett: 4)

o Ambala (Gp. Capt. DE Bouchier)

 No.2 Gnat (Main Dett: 8) (Wg. Cdr. Bharat Singh)

 No.23 Gnat (Main Dett.) (Wg. Cdr. S. Raghavendran)

o Agra

 No.5 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. PP Singh)

 No.35 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. Bakshish Singh)

 No.2 Gnat (Dett: 4)

o Hindon

 No.20 Hunter (Main Dett.) (Wg. Cdr. Amrit Lal Bajaj)

• IAF Eastern Air Command ( Air Vice Marshal Shivdev Singh)

o Kalaikonda (Gp. Capt. MB Naik)

 No.14 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. DA La Fontaine)

 No.16 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. PM Wilson) >>> Moved to WAC Agra

 No.24 Vampire (Sqn. Ldr. M. Banerji)

o Baghdogra (Wg. Cdr. MB Singh)

o Hashimara

 No.4 Ouragan (Sqn. Ldr. MM Singh)

o Chabua

 No.17 Hunter

o Gauhati

 No.37 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. McNeil) >>> Moved to WAC

Notes:

1. No.45/220 Vampire squadron was an amalgamated unit with 16 Vampires under the command of a Sqn. Ldr.

2. No.28 MiG-21 squadron had only nine aircraft as establishment.

Offensive Counter Air Operation & PAF Operational Deployment:-

Since the F-86 was the chief weapon system and mainstay of Pakistan Air Force. The F-86 fighter bomber aircraft was to play the major operational role in accordance with air war plan entailed extensive utilization on very massive level.

PAF fighter bomber squadrons of F-86s were required to operate from Peshawar, Sargodha, Lahore and Mauripur air bases against enemy air bases of Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara,Ambala in the northern sector,Jhodpur, Bhuj and Jamnagar in southern sector and Radar installations at Amritsar, Ferozpur, Patiala and Ambala in the northern sector and Porbander in the southern sector.

With in theses strike missions each F-86s formation of eight aircraft was allocated an alternative target.

PAF Battle Deployment before 1965 War:-

F-86s Sabre:( Fighter Bomber & Interceptors)

No. 5 Sqn

No. 11 Sqn

No. 14 Sqn

No. 15 Sqn

No. 16 Sqn

No. 17 Sqn

No. 18 Sqn

No. 19 Sqn

B-57s Martin:(Medium Night Bomber)

No. 7 Sqn

No. 8 Sqn

No. 24 Sqn (Elint/ECM/ESM/Phographic & Reconnaissance)

F-104s Star fighter(Mach 2 Interceptor)

No. 9 Sqn

T-33: Advanced Training Jet

No. 20 (Photograpic & Reconnaissance)

No. 2 Sqn

SA-16: Grumman Albatross Amphibious Maritime Reconnaissance

No. 4 Sqn

Tactical Transport & Communication

No. 6 Sqn ( Hercules C-130s)

No.12 Sqn

West Pakistan:-

o Sargodha (Gp. Capt. M.Z.Masud)

 No.5 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Sarfraz A. Rafiqui

 No.9 Sqn F-104 ( Sqn. Ldr. M. L. Middlecoat)

 No.11 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. M.M.Alam)

 No.15 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. M Arshad)

 No.20 Sqn R T-33 (Sqn. Ldr. M.M.Ahmed)

o Mauripur (Gp. Capt. Khaqan Abbasi)

 No.7 Sqn B-57s (Sqn. Ldr. Najeeb A. Khan) Later moved to Peshawar in September 1965.

 No.8 Sqn B-57s (Sqn. Ldr. Rais A. Rafi) Later moved to Peshawar in September 1965.

 No.16 Sqn F-86 (Sqn.Ldr. A.A.Randhawa)

 No.17 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. A. Daudpota) Later shifted to Sargodha in September.

 No.18 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Alauddin Butch) Later shifted to Sargodha in September.

 No.2 Sqn T-33 (Sqn. Ldr. Khurshid A. Mirza) Later a Dett of 4 moved to Sargodha

 No.4 Sqn SA-16 (Sqn. Ldr. Afsar K. Jadoon)

o Peshawar (Wing. Cdr. Amanullah)

 No.19 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. S. Sajjad Haider)

 No.24 Sqn RB-57Fs (Sqn. Ldr. M. Iqbal)

o Chaklala (Gp. Capt. E.G.Hall)

 No.6 Sqn C-130s (Wing. Cdr. A Masood Khan)

 No.12 Sqn Comp/Transport (Sqn. Ldr.M. M.Suhail)

o Risalpur ( Gp. Capt. C.R.Nawaz)

 Trainers Sqn T-6Gs Harvard (Sqn. Ldr. M.Yunis)

East Pakistan:-

o Dacca (Gp. Capt. Ghulam Haider)

 No.14 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Shabbir H. Syed)

Notes:

1. No.4 S-16 maritime reccee squadron had only four aircraft.

2. No.24 RB-57F Elint squadron had only four aircraft.

3. No.20 RT-33 squadron had only six aircraft

4. Every air base had its one T-33.

5. Four Bristal Freighter Transport aircraft kept in stores were readied to join C-130s.

Offensive Counter Air Operation & Operational Methodology:-

The air strike F-86s force was required to fly at tree top level, as to remain beneath the IAF s’ Radar Stations.

Each F-86s formation of 8 aircraft was required to attack IAF s’ air base, exclusively using six machine guns fire destroying enemy aircraft on priority.

Each F-86s formation of 8 aircraft was required to undertake 2-3 strafing runs on enemy targets for each mission/sortie.

The time over target (TOT) for each mission on the first day of opening hostilities, was defined to be 15 minutes before sunset.

The critical issue of the timing of the initial air strike missions by the fighter bomber force of F-86s before sun set was determined through lengthy debates held at High Command Level in the light of material factors and numerical superiority in favour of the Indian Air Force.

These were the major factors why the PAF High Command chose the timing of air strike missions 15 minutes before sunset:-

Timing of the first air strike missions:-

1. The Pakistan Air Force, a small air force countering a numerically superior the Indian Air Force , would not have the capability to deliver a decisive crippling blow in a single assault and could well provoked large scale enemy air force massive retaliation by resorting to one. Therefore, the timing selection in the early morning was not considered for initial air strike missions.

2. Since Second World War, air strike missions are carried out at dawn, as anticipated the numerically superior IAF would be ever vigilant to face the adversary. Several flights of Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres deployed at air bases on air defence alert duty would be waiting at the end of the runways on five minute alert at dawn since morning. It was carefully calculated to be most unlikely that they would have stayed at this state of readiness indefinitely.

3. The IAF state of alert would have past its peak, when no air raids had materialized with in two to three hours since dawn the IAF would more than likely have lessened the high alert and switched off some of the radars.

4. Therefore, air strike missions carried out against IAF major air bases 15 minutes before sunset by the PAF would achieve an element of complete surprise, pulverizing the enemy in a state of shock and nerve shattering blow by delivering devastating blitzkrieg.

5. The major portion of the Indian Air Force would suppose to be caught on the ground.

6. By carrying out a dusk air strike missions 15 minutes before sunset, on the other hand, The PAF would be safe from an immediate counter attacks from enemy air force; It could sustain enemy pressure during the night relatively safely and would reasonably well prepared by the next morning to face reprisals as also ready to deliver further air strike missions against enemy air force.

The air strike missions operating except from Peshawar air base, were to be repeated the next day, making 15 minutes before sun rise as their time over target. From Mauripur air base, four T-33s were also configured to supplement the F-86s formations for air strike missions.

Lahore air base located nearest to the Indian border was to be activated for occasional operational utilization since first week of the war at short notice. Two formations of eight F-86s each from Mauripur and Peshawar air bases were to move in there at six hours notice, thereby assembling a single largest formation of 16 aircraft for initial air strike mission against Ambala airbase to be led by Sqn Ldr Sajad Haider OC 19 Sqn along with Sqn Ldr Waqar Azim OC 17 Sqn, as a staging air base. The Lahore runway lenght was 6000 feet, therefore both the F-86s formations were to be ensured fully operational on the runway day and night taking off and landing practice as per specific order issued by C-in-C Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan in a mission briefing held at Air Headquarters on June 28, 1965.

The F-86s Squadron operating from Dacca air base, East Pakistan was required to strike enemy major air base at Kalaikunda, located near Calcutta by dawn only on the very next day of the Indo-Pak war.

The major portion of the fighter bomber F-86s Squadrons force was to be deployed at Sargodha air base as a main nucleolus of air strike and other operational missions, leaving one F-86s Squadron each at Peshawar, Mauripur and Dacca air bases.

Offensive Counter Air Operation & Night Bombing Missions Profile:-

The paramount mission of the B-57s Bomber Wing night bombing operations was to deny the numerically superior Indian Air Force, Thereby to sustain the pressure of the fighter bomber F-86s force s’ air strike missions at dusk, the PAF s’ Bomber Wing of B-57s operating from Mauripur and Peshawar was to bomb enemy aircraft on the ground, runways, hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps at major IAF s’ air bases at Jamnagar, Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot through out the first night of the air operations, starting at 2030 and ending an hour before sun rise the next day.

The Bomber B-57s s’ formation recovering at Sargodha air base after their first air strike mission at Adampur and Halwara were to turnaround and leave for Agra and Palm air bases.

The Bomber formations recovering at Peshawar air base were to make a second bombing run to Adampur and Halwara; or hit the enemy aircraft parked at Ambala and Chandigarh air bases as alternatives.

Old work horse propeller training aircraft in action:-

The Harvard T-6Gs Training Squadron from Risalpur air base was required to harass the Indian Army on the first night in the areas; Amritsar-Jullunder axis and Ferozpur-Ludhiana axis operating from Chaklala & Lahore as staging air bases, assigned mission of night offensive road recce.

The operational utilization of the Harvard aircraft was fully studied and its operational missions in the coming September war could be attributed to the Operation Desert Hawk.

Defensive Counter Air Operation & Air Defence Command Profile:-

As per Air War Plan of June , 1965., the Air Defence Battle of West and East Pakistan during the hostilities with India was to be commanded by Air Officer Commanding(AOC) Air Defence, as per requirement of the emerging air war scenario, from the Interceptor fighters force detailed at its disposal. The force comprised the following squadrons, as Sargodha air base would be the major centre of gravity during war.

1. One F-104s Squadron armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) deployed at Sargodha airbase.

2. One F-86s Squadron armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) deployed at Sargodha airbase.

A formation of four F-86s Interceptor fighters armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) was also earmarked for Peshawar airbase along with another formation of four F-86s Interceptor fighters armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) would be sent to Mauripur airbase simultaneously from Sargodha air base. Apart from this, a portion of the F-86s Squadrons operating from Peshawar, Mauripur and Dacca were also assigned to air defence missions.

A Meticulous Air War Plan !

From critical prospective and analysis, An intricate air war plan that had all the elements of dynamic approach, daring initiative and surprise which are essential for success in a strategic situation tilted heavily in favour of the superior enemy Air Force. The meticulous air war plan was contemplated by Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan Commander-in-Chief, PAF and his Air Staff on the employment of the Pakistan Air Force in the air defense battle for Pakistan. It was kept up-to-date and modified as strategic circumstances demanded.

Offensive Counter Air Operation s’ inherent advantages:-

A. Offensive Operation allows the attacker to seize the initiative, capitalize the optimum level capabilities of the Air Force and concentrate strength Vs weakness.

B. It carries the air war to the enemy centre of nucleolus, reduces the number of offensive sorties that numerically superior enemy Air Force can mount and forces enemy Air Force to detailed a substantial portion of its total air force s’ Squadrons to dedicated defensive operations.

C. It can better exploit the three dimensions space of the skies, the vagaries of light and weather and the masking effect of terrain.

D. It denies the enemy air force a sanctuary.

The Strategic Parametres/Levels of the Air War Plan June, 1965 were thoroughly been worked out in advance as well keeping the operational levels of the air bases, wings & squadrons through periodic exercises at par with strategic milestone of the air battle for Pakistan:-

1. Offensive Counter Air Operation

2. Defensive Counter Air Operation

3. Anti Surface Force Operation

Although some tactical level changes and up dates were made by Air Marshal M Nur Khan, C-in-C, the PAF in the light of imminent air battle scenario with enemy air force , thereby activating Air Force on phase-I, II & III during August 1965

The ultimate success of a war plan depends not so much on the plan itself, as upon the human response which the actual situation evokes Courage, Dedication, Sacrifice, Inspiring Leadership and Accurate timely Judgment form part of no man made plan, but it is these very attributes which, in moments of critical danger and anxiety, manifest or absent themselves to tilt the balance of divine fate between success and failure, victory and defeat in the annals of air warfare.

The war plan would have been put on supreme test during the Indo-Pak war with in three months by the highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional Air Force against the numerically superior enemy Air Force.

The Pakistan Air Force rose to the decisive air battle for Pakistan under this air war plan during the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and returned with flying colours, registering its name in golden words in the annals of air warfare.

Pakistani Nation s’ debt to its Air Force “Those wonderful young men’: Never have so many owed so much to so few.”

Bibliography:-

1.“The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.By: Shaheen Foundation ,Islamabad.”

2.“The History of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-1982.By: Shabbir Hussain & Sqn Ldr. M.Tariq Qureshi.”

3.” Battle for Pakistan” The Air War of 1965. by: John Fricker

4. “The First Round” By Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Air Force

5. The Story of the Indian Air Force”Bharat Rakshak”

6.” A History of the Pakistan Army” by: Col.Brian Cloughley

7. “Memoirs” by: Lt. General Gul Hassan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Army

8.” Fiza’ya:Psyche of The Pakistan Air Force” by:P.Singh & R.Rakhye

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