Arabs-Israel Air War June,1967
By: Arshad Hussain

Political Background & Strategic Events which led towards War.

Aerial Battle of Israel Air Force & Syrian Air Force

April 7th The root cause of the war began to developed when Israel Air Force strafed and bombed Syrian Army s’ field guns shelling Israeli farmers in a demilitarized zone near Sea of Galilee, in the subsequent air battle between Israel Air Force and Syrian Air Force lost its 6 MIG Fighters. Egypt & Syria signed the mutual Defence Pact.

May 14th The Egyptian Army was reported by the foreign media advancing towards Suez Canal & Sinai from Cairo & adjacent areas. The Israel Government announced Red Alert for its armed forces including the Air Force and Armoured Divisions.

May 16th The Egyptian Government declared state of emergency placing the Army, Air Force and the Navy into defensive deployments on the Israeli frontiers.

May 17th- 18th The Jordanian, Kuwaiti & Syrian Forces were mobilized for deployments.

May 19th The UN Forces officially withdrawn from Gaza Strip.

May 19th Meanwhile, the Israel Air Force got well prepared to hit hard at numerically superior enemy Air Forces through offensive counter air operations on the ground & in the air and the Government approval through Israeli Cabinet was sought in advance. Egypt Air Force was the key target for air war plan of IAF.

Naval Blockade

May 22nd The Egyptian Navy imposed Naval Blockade of Straits of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba, banning the Israeli merchant & cargo ships as well all ships entering or leaving the Gulf of Aqaba.

May 23rd The Israel Government declared Egyptian Naval Blockade of Straits of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba as an act of War.




May 23rd The Egyptian Air Force s’ Mig-21s undertaking photo reconnaissance missions over flew at major IAF air bases from Dead Sea towards El Arish air base.

May 24th The US Navy s’6th Fleet/Carrier Group of about 50 warships deployed on patrolling in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Egypt & Jordan Mutual Defence Pact

May 30th President Nasser of Egypt & King Hussain of Jordan signed the Mutual Defence Pact in Cairo. The Strategic Alliance of both the countries proved to a curtain raiser of war, Now the Israel Government decided to retaliate with pre-emptive air strikes against major enemy Egypt on priority and subsequently other Arab countries.
Tel Aviv, Israel

June 1st The Israeli Government appointed General Moshe Dayan Minister for Defence a decorated star of 1956 Egypt-Israel war. Because the Israeli public demanded it. Iraq Air Force deployed its MIGs & Hawker Hunters in H-3 air base nearest to Israel.

June 2nd General Moshe Dayan told a correspondent of News of the World “The outcome of the war would be decided in the air.”

General Moshe Dayan, General Hod Air Chief of the IAF and Brigadier General Weizmann, among the few Israeli Military Generals who firmly represent a school of thought that their Air Force could destroy the Egypt Air Force and any other Arab Air Force in the air defence battle of Israel without Tel Aviv & other major cities subjected to enemy Air Force bombardment in the War and the Air Force is the highly cost effective arm for Israel to carry the war in enemy s’ heart.

June 3rd The Israeli Cabinet meeting in a secret session on the mid-night of June 3rd - June 4th released its final approval of pre-emptive air strikes by the Air Force & launching of ground attacks by the Army against Arab countries as on 5th June, 1967 in the early morning hours.

June 3rd The Israeli Government successfully camouflaging its aggressive designs issued a routine communiqué designed for use by Monday 5th June, 1967 s’ Newspapers & Media. “All OK & NORMAL”

June 3rd The western media & newspapers reported at the behest of Israeli media structured information plan “A large portion of the Israeli forces were sent on leave and were seen sporting on the beaches on Saturday & Sunday.”



June 3rd An Egyptian double secret agent in Tel Aviv sending back reports of Israeli Nation in a holiday mood in accordance with Israel s’ war plan.

June 4th Whereas, By the Sunday evening, IAF s’ Every Air Force General, Commanders, Pilots , Engineers & Technicians as well civilians working shoulders to shoulders knew that the next early morning they would at air war with Egypt Air Force in accordance with Israel s’ air war plan.


Cairo, Egypt Amman, Jordan & Damascus ,Syria

June 3rd On the other end, After many days of tension & anxiety among Government Circles in Cairo, Amman and Damascus were began to relax and felt that victory had been achieved without fighting a war with Israel. The Egyptian Government controlled Cairo Radio & Television network “Sout ul Arab” played a major role about this entitlement trap or so-called victory. Later on this propaganda proved to be a double edge sword for the Arab Governments & its People particularly the Kingdom of Jordan & its people.

Cairo Blue Night of June 4th, 1967

June 4th The majority of the Egyptian Air Force s’ pilots, combat commanders along with their Air Chief Air Marshal Mahmood Sidki and other high ranking officers were gathered in a leading night club of Cairo to enjoy striptease dances & whisky drink parties with beautiful ladies throughout the blue night of June 4th till the morning of 5th June celebrating this so-called victory against Israel Air Force. The party was exclusive for EAF personnel. During the climax of high 24 hours, An innovative game in the night club was announced by the owner of club as a chief host to highlight the victory celebrations among pilots by forming groups of women led by most beautiful dancer & men led by Air Marshal Mahmood as chief guest. Men posed as MIGs of Egyptian Air Force and women posed as Mirages of Israel Air Force and a battle game for victory over Mirages Vs MIGs started there in the candles light and continued the whole night. Around four hundred fighter pilots of MIGs & Sukhois & their seniors remained there to enjoy the long blue night game, were badly exhausted to report for duties to air force bases, radars located around Cairo and in Sinai desert to undertake combat flying & air defence missions in the early morning of June 5th, 1967.

In the morning after grand blue night party, Air Marshal Mahmood Sidki C-in-C, the Egypt Air Force and Field Marshal Hakim Amer C-in-C, the Egypt Army were scheduled to visit Egyptian Air Force s’ forward air bases and radar stations located in Sinai desert. EAF s’ Air Headquarters located in Cairo, issued orders to SAMs batteries & Ack Ack batteries around the Egypt not to open fire at any aircraft during this scheduled visit on the morning of June 5th, 1967.


Senior officers were almost on the roads to report offices around 9.00 A.M. Cairo time, A number of formation of MIGs-21 & 19 and SU-7s fully armed ready to take off waiting on ORP for fighter pilots to man them, but Egypt Air Force s’ aircraft were empty, except few student pilots and EAF s’ pilots were having breakfast in the mess. While the first IAF s’ formations after formation was making its way in the air, the entire high command of the Egypt Air Force and the Army was in the air on its way to inspect EAF s’ air bases & radars as well the Army units deployed in Sinai; to ensure the safety of VVIP aircraft heading to Sinai, the above orders issued to SAMs & Ack Ack batteries not to open fire at any aircraft during this scheduled visit. Since Egypt s’ AAA system was integrated with radars, therefore the EAF s’ radar network was also shut down.

This key information about the Egyptian Air Force s’ operational level and visit detail was immediately transmitted to Moss ad s’ Headquarters in Tel Aviv by the owner of the night club of Cairo before boarding a passenger aircraft of Italian Air Line A Italia leaving for Rome in the early morning of June 5th, 1967. As Moss ad was running and funding his night club in the posh area of Cairo since long time. The owner was a well known high profile figure among Egypt s’ armed forces circles and a number of personnel from Air Force, Army and Navy were at his pay roll to exchange sensitive information & data required by the Moss ad. Men s’ Lust for women, wine & wealth eroded moral character and integrity among them. Where Money can manage anything for them was the thumb rule of espionage game contemplated by Israel Intelligence Agency “Moss ad”!

The owner of the club was, An Israeli agent/spy master. His intelligence communication network was very actively transmitting on line information about the Egypt Air Force and the Egypt Army to Moss ad. Although, Egyptian Air Force s’ counter communication intelligence triangulated its secret transmission in that night club on the night of June 4th and A contingent of air force police was detailed to arrest the Israeli spy master. However, the spy master successfully secured his neck from its clutches with the timely intervention by the Air Marshal Mahmood Sidki during the mid stream of the blue night party.

So the Israeli air war plan had successfully achieved complete surprise and its objective, The ultimate outcome of the war would be the surprise & pre-emptive air strikes against numerically superior Egypt Air Force in the early morning of June 5th, 1967 at about 9.00 A.M Cairo time and 8.00 A.M Tel Aviv Time.









Air Battle Deployments before June 5th, 1967


Israel Air Force Vs Arab Air Forces (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan & Lebanon)


Israel Air Force: 240 Combat Aircraft & 60 Trainer Aircraft= 300 Aircraft
Mirage-IIIs, Mysteres,Vaotours, Ouragans, Fouga-Magister
Trainers & C-130s


Egypt Air Force: 450 Combat Aircraft & 70 Trainer Aircraft= 520 Aircraft
MIGs-21s, 19s,17s & 15s, SU-7s,Bomber TU-16s & IL-28s MIGs-15
Trainers, Cargo AN-12s & Helicopters MI-4s & 6s


Syria Air Force: 120 Combat Aircraft & 40 Trainer Aircraft= 160 Aircraft
MIGs-21s, 19s & 17s, SU-7s, Bomber IL-28s,MIGs-15
Trainers, Cargo AN-12s & Helicopters MI-4s & 6s


Iraq Air Force: 200 Combat Aircraft & 50 Trainer Aircraft= 250 Aircraft
MIGs-21s, 19s, & 17s Hawker Hunter, Bomber TU-16s & IL-28s
MIGs-15s Trainers, Cargo AN-12s & Helicopters MI-4s & 6s


Jordan Air Force: 40 Combat Aircraft Hawker Hunters


Lebanon Air Force: 18 Combat Aircraft Hawker Hunters



Final Tally

IAF s’ 300 aircraft = Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan & Lebanon Air Forces s’ 988 aircraft








IAF s’ Air Strategy

The IAF s’ Air Strategy before the air war of 1967,was carefully contemplated and up dated based on the two key areas of the Air War Plan.

Counter Air Operation

The strategic aim of counter air operation was to achieve the desired level of control of the air at the outset of the hostilities. In the first phase of the air war in which entire Air Force was detailed with counter air operations against Egypt Air Force and subsequently shifting its balance towards Syria Air Force, Iraq Air Force and Jordan Air Force etc.

Anti Surface Force Operation

The strategic aim of anti surface force operation was to deprive Egyptian ,Syrian Iraqi & Jordanian Armies needed to occupy the territories of Israel on all fronts.

Operational Methodology

The IAF, as part of the force –mix was required to achieve complete air superiority through counter air operation against Egypt Air Force. The prime objective of the air strike was to make enemy s’ runways unusable and destroy as many EAF s’ MIG-21s as possible. As the MIG-21s was the only air superiority aircraft which could effectively prevent the IAF achieving its strategic objective to achieve complete air superiority through counter air operation against EAF s’ air bases in the initial round of the air battle.

The forty Mirage-IIIs fighter bombers at 0745 A.M. Tel Aviv & 0845 A.M. Cairo time on the morning 5th June the first wave of the IAF air strike went out and directed against ten airfields of EAF named El Arish, Gebel Libni, Bir Gifgafa, Bir Thamada, Abu Sueir, Karbit, Inchas, Cairo West, Ben Suief and Fayid.

0745 A.M. Tel Aviv ( Israel Standard Time) & 0845 A.M. Cairo time ( Egypt Standard Time). Why 0745 AM was selected by the IAF to carry out air strikes against EAF s’air bases & radars rather than 0800 or 0815 ? Because Egyptians get to their offices at about 0900 AM. Pre-emptive air strikes 15 minutes before that time would bogged down Air Force s’ Commanders and the Army Generals on the way to Headquarters and Pilots and airmen on the way to air bases and other units.






At the time of year in June, there is a morning mist much over of the River Nile, the Delta and the Suez Canal. By 0730 the mist has just about dispersed. Around 0800 the weather is usually at its optimum. The visibility is at its best because of the angle of the Sun, and the air is at stillest, which is important when it matters to dropping bombs accurately on runways by IAF.

Since IAF s’ pilots & navigators had to on the deck at least three hours before getting airborne for first air strike at 0745; that would have meant their getting up at about 0345. By the evening of the first day of the air war they would possibly have no sleep for 24-36 hours with the whole night and possibly the next day of air operations ahead of them.

The EAF state of the alert would have been past. When no air attacks by the IAF had materialized within two –three hours after dawn the Air Force would more than likely have lessened their air defence alert of several formations of MIG-21s & 19s & SU-7s waiting ORP at the end of the runways on 5 minutes alert since dawn every day and switched off some of their radar scanners around Cairo and Sinai desert.

Whereas Egypt Air Force was flying one or two formations of MIGs-21 on air defence alert orbiting over its air bases, since the dawn. Most likely time for an enemy Air Force to attack air bases. EAF s’MIG-21s s’ flying time & endurance was carefully calculated by the planning staff of the IAF monitoring through Early Warning Radars since May 14, 1967.The anticipated landing time of the enemy aircraft formations on air defence would safely be worked out in advance even through stop watch.

Therefore, IAF s’ High Command worked out it safe to assume that by around 0730
Tel Aviv time & 0830 Cairo time, the enemy Air Force had lowered its guards.

The attack time frame was calculated very carefully and pre-determined in advance, so that each formation will carry out air attacks against each enemy air base simultaneously.

The striking force/formations were instructed to fly at tree top level to avoid radar detection and to achieve maximum surprise.

Each striking formation consists of four fighter bombers flying in pairs.










Major Events & Operational Overview of IAF s’ Pre-emptive Air Strike plans

Israel Air Force s’ Chief General Hod along with Brigadier General Weizmann was in the Operational Command Headquarters located some where beneath the ground. General Moshe Dayan, Minister for Defence was also there to witness the head start of the Air war launched under code named “Operation Moked” by the IAF at 0745 A.M. Tel Aviv ( Israel Standard Time).

When the last formations of the EAF s’ jets early morning patrols got airborne and appeared on IAF s’ High Powered Early Warning Radar Network s’ Large Screens. General Hod immediately pressed his stopwatch. He knew very well how long the MIG-21 can stay airborne by 0745 hours, the MIG-21s formation would be almost out of fuel and on the point of landing.

The first wave of the IAF air strike formations of forty Mirage-IIIs fighter bombers at 0745 A.M. Tel Aviv & 0845 A.M. Cairo time on the morning of 5th June took off and headed against ten airfields of EAF named El Arish, GebelLibni, Bir Gifgafa, Bir Thamada, Abu Sueir, Karbit, Inchas, Cairo West, Ben Suief and Fayid. As the first strike force struck the enemy targets in Egypt as per mission, the second force of forty aircraft was already on its way and the third force of forty aircraft had just got airborne. Each force was flying spaced at 10-minutes intervals.

Each formation of four aircraft was allotted seven minutes over its targets enough for 3-4 runs, one bombing run and 2-3 strafing runs. An extra three minutes were allowed for navigational error or for an extra run over the target. Entire IAF was airborne to hit hard the numerically superior Egypt Air Force in the initial hours of the air battle, Because the survival of the Israel was at stake!

The IAF s’ High Command had left behind only twelve Mirage-IIIs for interception & air defence operations to safe guard Israel s’ airspace and its air bases & radars, eight were flying top cover, four were parked on the ORP at the end of the runway.

ECM units of IAF against EAF s’ radar stations were deliberately not operated before 0745 on Monday morning as the stealth operations might well have given the enemy air force advanced warning that something was up there. IAF s’ ECM units played well with EAF s’ High Powered Early Warning & Surveillance Radar Network of 23 units of Russian three dimension radar P-35s around Egypt, flapping with big ears.

The attacking force in formations of four aircraft made their way by various routes some by a short circular right hook over the sea to the EAF s air bases around Cairo, the Suez Canal and in Sinai. Other headed straight across to attack the enemy air bases in upper delta.




The strike force jets flew at very low level not more than 70-100 feet above ground or sea level, so as to remain beneath the EAF High Powered Early Warning & Surveillance Radars and SAMs batteries around airbases.

Prior to the first pre-emptive air strike by the enemy Air Force, On the other end EAF s’ air bases were witnessing an overwhelming calm and silence, then an uproar of returning MIG-21s descending to land on the runways broke the silence for time being, then coming to parking area.

Long before the complete silence descended over the air base, A high speed formation of four delta wing aircraft swooped in flying at tree top level to pulled up to 5000-6000 feet above the air base before turning for dive bombing attack angles. The 500 lbs & 1000 lbs specific purpose built bombs began hit hard the runways, taxiways and culvert dropped by the attacking jets, the bombs scored wonderful, blinding, bursting hits, bang on the targets. The aiming accuracy and precision was above the board. Enemy had pulverized the EAF s’ personnel particularly fighter pilots and air defence commanders on the air bases with shock and surprise around 0910 AM Cairo time, when chances of surprise air strike were out of consideration.

Then attacking jets turned towards ORP and parking area to began repeated strafing runs against enemy aircraft. The EAF s’ MIG-21 & 19s & SU-7s aircraft parked on the airbases proved to be sitting ducks and fell prey to the enemy Air Force s’ attacking formation. The IAF s’ formations delivering delayed fused bombs over the targets with pinpoint accuracy shocking the enemy Egypt air force with surprise and agony , leaving behind a trail of smoke and fire engulfing enemy air bases with 7-8 minutes duration.

Although EAF s’ SAMs units fired a number of SA-2 missiles against low level attacking IAF s’ jets, but failed to hit any attacking jet during the air strikes over air bases. Ack Ack batteries also could not engaged and hit enemy jets with in timely accurate firing, because enemy air force hit hard EAF s’ around ten major air bases by achieving complete surprise and pulverizing them with low level bombing and strafing accurately right on the targets.

About eight formations of EAF s’ MIG-21s were destroyed, while taxing to the end of the runways, whereas twelve MIG-21s & eight Mig-19s heading to the air bases near Canal during mid stream of the IAF s’ air strike, found no runways to land also fell prey to the enemy s’ attacking fighter bombers.

However, the EAF s’ two formations of four MIG-21s were able to get airborne for timely interception and succeeded in shooting down two IAF s’ jets, before they themselves were shot down.




A training formation of four MIG-21s aircraft flown by one instructor and three student pilots was already airborne, when IAF s’ air strike force went in while, major part of the Egypt Air Force was caught on the ground.

Each air strike against EAF s’air base was made by a formation of four fighter bomber flying in two pairs, every aircraft pair struck its target, carried out its operational mission exactly as planned and every bomb exploded on the target as reported by the pilots. Nine out ten enemy air bases were precisely hit at the same time, the tenth Fayid air base was attacked a few minutes later, as it was still covered by the morning mist over the Suez Canal.

The IAF had devised and perfected the specific purpose bombs for destroying the runways. As soon as the bomb leaves the aircraft a retro-rocket is fired to stop its forward impetus. Then a booster rocket drives it into the runway. Once it has penetrated the concrete a time fuse explodes it. The fuse may be instantaneous or may be set on a variable time-delay. The runways are considered easy to repair, but is more dangerous when the runway kept exploding.

A pair of Mirage-IIIs destroyed EAF s’ sixteen TU-16s bombers on the ground through dive bombing making several runs within four to six minutes before returning from mission. The attacking jets destroyed original combat aircraft and dummy mock-up under camouflage cover untouched, because Moss ad s’ intelligence network provided them accurate on-line positions of EAF s’ deployment in the air bases.

Altogether 19 EAF s’ air bases & 23 radar stations were hit by the IAF on 5th June, 1967. The Counter air operation was completed before afternoon. It was estimated about 100 pilots of the EAF were killed during the first day air strikes and subsequently EAF s’ 309 front fighter bomber aircraft including bomber force of all TU-16s, ground equipments, ammunition dumps, runways including 23 radar stations with number of SAM batteries in the first two days of the air war with IAF were either completely or partially destroyed. In the first two days of air war, the IAF logged more than 1000 operational sorties, around 500 sorties per day.

For about 80 minutes counter air operation with any let up the IAF kept attacking the EAF s’ air bases, then after a 10-15 minutes interval, there followed a further 80 minutes of air strikes. In total , 2 hours & 50 minutes the IAF destroyed the offensive punch of the EAF and effectively broken its as a formidable fighting force to challenge the IAF in the air.

El-Arish the major EAF s’ air base located in Sinai was attacked by hitting enemy aircraft there, but its runways were not targeted, since Israeli war plan called for its utilization as forward staging, supply and casualty evacuation air base. Therefore by the Tuesday evening it was in the operational use by the IAF.



By 1035 hours Tel Aviv time & 1135 hours Cairo time on the Monday 5th June, 1967 The numerically superior Egypt Air Force had been destroyed on the airfields, with out launching for any major air battle with the arch enemy the IAF. It had no longer constituted an effective fighting force and thereby unable to provide air defence operations and air support missions for the Egyptian Army deployed in the Sinai.

General Hod counted on having a couple of hours had start in which to deal with the EAF before having to cope with those of Jordan Air Force, Syria Air Force and the Iraq Air Force.

Jordan Air Force, Syria Air Force and the Iraq Air Force.

On the Monday morning, the Syrian Air Force bombed oil refinery in Haifa and made air strike against IAF s’ air base Megiddo successfully destroying few aircraft. Whereas, the IAF retaliated by attacking Syrian air bases located around Damascus by targeting aircraft on the ground.

Jordan Air Force s’ Hawker Hunters successfully attacked IAF s’ air base Kefer Sirkin, destroying some cargo transport aircraft there. When, the IAF s’ 6 Mystere-IV attacked the major air base Mafraq. A formation of Jordan Air Force s’ Hawker Hunters scrambled to intercept the enemy in the air led by Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam SJ a decorated star of the PAF; in the ensuing aerial combat Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam shot down one of the Mystere and extensively damaging another aircraft. His wing man Lt. Ihsan Shurdom also successfully shot one Mystere during the battle, surviving lucky Israeli pilots fled back. Meanwhile, the numerically superior IAF s’ fighter bomber formations after formation kept bombing Mafraq & Amman air bases, putting them out of action together with Jordan radar station located at Ajlun by logging 51 operational sorties in a day. However, the small size valiant Jordan Air Force virtually been knocked out after putting gallant air battle Vs numerically superior enemy Israel Air Force.

Iraq Air Force s’ TU-16s bombers attacked Israeli town Natanya, one bomber was shot down by the IAF s’ interceptor aircraft. The IAF s’ Vautours bombers & Mirage-IIIs made air strike against Iraqi air base located at H-3. A formation of four Iraq Air Force s’ Hawker Hunters led by PAF s’ Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam along with wing man Lt. Ihsan Shurdom , Lt Samir & Lt. Muhammad scrambled to challenge attacking IAF s’ jets over the base.

Leader Saif keeping the traditional courage and professionalism of the PAF s’ falcons alive by shooting down enemy hi-tech aircraft Mirage-III and then Vautours bomber during this swift and decisive air battle with the IAF. His wing man Lt.Ihsan also shot down one Vautours bomber. Valiant youngest Iraqi Air Force s’ Lt. Muhammad embraced shahadat fighting against enemy Air Force.




The IAF s’ numerically superior force counter air operation against H-3 air base proved to be ill fated mission, surviving lucky Israeli pilots fled back to tell the horrible tale of aborted mission against a highly professional & dedicated formation of hawker hunters led by Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam. One of the biggest operational loss of the IAF during the air battle of June, 1967.,the IAF s’ Chief General Hod acknowledged this aerial encounter over Iraqi air base H-3 that critique of H-3 fiasco made him feel almost as if he had lost the air war.

So the PAF s’ lone fighting falcon Flt Lt. Saif ul Azam emerged the highest decorated star of air battles with numerically super enemy air force by shooting down highest number of enemy aircraft in June 1967 Arabs Israel war.


Net Operational Losses of Arabs Israel air war of June, 1967

Net Losses by the IAF : 40 Combat aircraft & 6 trainer aircraft

Vs

Net Losses by the Egypt Air Force : 309 Combat aircraft & 4 trainer aircraft

Net Losses by the Syrian Air Force : 60 Combat aircraft & trainer aircraft

Net Losses by the Jordan Air Force : 29 Combat aircraft

Net Losses by the Iraq Air Force : 17 Combat aircraft

Net Losses by the Lebanon Air Force : 1 Combat aircraft


Final Analysis & Critique about Air War of June, 1967

The “Operation Moked” was extraordinarily success and led to a sensational and dramatic victory for the Israel Air Force. Since morning 0845 A.M within 2 hours & 50 minutes the IAF destroyed the offensive punch of the EAF by targeting 309 combat aircraft & radars and effectively broken its as a formidable fighting force to challenge the IAF in the air and subsequently dealing with the other Arab Air Forces was side show.

Field Marshal Amer in the Egypt Army Headquarters Cairo, tried to piece a new war plan from the wreckage of the Egyptian Air Force. He ordered the Air Marshal Mahmood to launch the Air Force to hit back the Israelis, but the reply he received was that the little that remained of the EAF was unable to carry out any meaningful air operations.


Even Egypt s’ President Nasser was later to complained. “They (IAF s’ air strikes) came from the Western direction; he said when we expected them to come from the Eastern direction.” Because the Egypt Air Defence s’ SAMs & AAA batteries were pointed towards the Eastern sides.

King Hussain of Jordan was informed by Egyptian Marshal Amer in the early hours of 5th June telling lies, keeping him in darkness about the material ground realities of the air war ‘s outcome; “Approximately 75% of the Israel Air Force s’ aircraft have been destroyed or put out of action by the EAF. UAR s’ troops have engaged the enemy and taken the offensive on the grounds.”

President Nasser also had called to King Hussain telling lies. “ We have sent all our combat aircraft against Israel. Since early this morning our Air Force is bombing the IAF s’ airfields.”

As the above Telephonic conversations were intercepted and recorded by the Israeli Intelligence Agency “Moss ad.” Later on its tape recorded version was released to International Media & Press.

Since, President Nasser already knew that his Air Force was totally been destroyed in the pre-emptive air strikes carried out by the IAF.

The Syrians’ President and Air Force s’ Chief General Hafiz ul Asad sensed dangerous military scenario leading to ultimate military defeat, after perceiving the fateful end of the Egypt Air Force and the Jordan Air Force by the IAF, refused to provide air support for the Jordanian Army requested by King Hussain against the Israeli Army ; “All our aircraft were on training missions and not a single aircraft was available.”

Whereas, Egyptian Air Force s’ Command & Control s’ lacked of foresight ness, vision and professionalism at higher, mid and lower levels, Therefore part of the Israel Air Force s’ stunning victory resulted from the recklessness, blind folly and ineptitude of the Egypt s’ bankrupt political –military leadership at the helms of affairs.

Army rule under the Military Rulers Col. Nasser after General Neguib in Egypt, destroyed the integral fabric of professionalism, system criteria and merit among the Air Force, the Army and the Navy; Political appointees & blue eyed mediocre cadres promoted to led the Air Force, thereby denying professional, moral and social ethics and norms.

Same Political situation also prevailed in Iraq & Syria due to the Army rulers, destroyed the integral fabric of professionalism, system criteria and merit among the Air Force, the Army and the Navy; Political appointees & blue eyed mediocre cadres promoted to led the Air Force, thereby denying professional, moral and social ethics and norms.




The Arab Air Forces in the above Arab countries became the tool of elite ruling Military Junta rather to be the razor sharp air war machines every ready to fight the war with Enemy Israel Air Force.

Israel Air Force s’ Chief General Hod stated the following reasons for the classical air battle of June, 1967:-

Sixteen years of Air War Planning had gone into those initial 90 minutes. The planning was prepared on professional and technical grounds, up dated and perfected constantly in accordance with Strategic, Operational and Tactical requirement/Military Doctrine of the Israel.

Intelligence gathering & Analysis of enemy Air Forces and operational activities covering the exact location and details of the enemy air bases; the precise details of combat aircraft, radar and missile batteries deployment positions was accurate and real time information/data was receiving from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan through “Moss ad” s’ agents network very active in Government circles of Egypt and Syria. The latest data/information was timely processed and promptly reported to the IAF for air war operations. Otherwise, military situation might had been different.

Operational Control: The ability to absorb and integrate with existing air war plan, latest data/information as it received in and to reported fresh data/information and assigning new targets to the IAF s’ pilots in the air played a very vital part in the success of the air war operations.

The Successful Execution of the Air War Plan by the IAF s’ pilots was a very vital link in the chain of success. It reflected number of years of rigorous training-in flying, navigation, gunnery and bombing precision.

Fastest Turn Around Time played a key factor in achieving the desired results in the air war.

Service & Maintenance of the combat aircraft was also a key factor in achieving the desired results in the air war.

The Air War Plan “Operation Moked” by the IAF had been conceived on the basis that time frame would be short, therefore Israel Military Victory would have to be achieved as swift and decisive as possible.

The High Command of the IAF had thorough and accurate appreciation of its numerically superior enemy Egypt Air Force as well other Air Forces and its capabilities and operational limitations in terms of war & peace. This key factor proved to be the ultimate secret of the lightning air victory of Israel.


The political leadership of Israel s’ Prime Minister Eshkol and Defence Minister General Moshe Dayan professionally acknowledged the paramount significance of its Air Force by providing fee hand to General Hod and Brigadier General Weizmann to contemplate and launch the pre emptive air strikes against its key enemy Egypt Air Force on priority and subsequently other Arab Air Forces, the entire military planning of the Israel Army against enemy Arab Armies was heavily depended upon successful air superiority through counter air operations by the IAF.



Bibliography

1. The Six Day War by: Randolph S/ & Winston S. Churchill
2. Israel s’ Wars 1947-93 by: Ahron Bregman
3. NEWSWEEK, New York, USA.
4. TIMES INTERNATIONAL,New York, USA.
5. The Art of Blitzkrieg by: Charles Messenger
6. Many National & International Newspapers
7. The Story of the Pakistan Air Force by Shaheen Foundation,Islamabad.

Security Scenario Alarming, says IAF Chief

HINDON (Ghaziabad)PTI, Oct 8, 2010, 12.36pm IST: IAF chief P V Naik on Friday described the current security scenario in India's neighbourhood as a "volcano" that may erupt anytime and asked the air warriors to be prepared to meet both internal and external challenges.

"Current security scenario is like a volcano and may test your skills anytime without warning. These times require swift action," Naik said addressing the Air Force Day parade here.

The Air Chief Marshal said that operational preparedness was the key to meet the complex and intensive threat with "speed of response, flexibility and precision".

Noting that the Air Force would turn itself into a potent aerospace power within the next five to seven years, he said the future inductions such as the 126 MMRCA, flight refuelling aircraft, AWACS and other platforms would pose technological challenges that need to be met by imbibing new skills.

Pointing out that the new communication network, ASNET, had changed the way the Air Force conducts its operations, Naik said the Air Force was moving quickly to become a network centric aerospace power.

"We have the responsibility to absorb the new technology and operate all systems effectively to secure, protect and to preserve Air Force's ground and air assets with diligence and utmost prudence," Naik said.

Later, interacting with the media, Naik said he had described the security situation as "volcanic" because it was not known when it would erupt.

On modernisation and new acquisitions, the Air Force Chief said that the MMRCA and fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) that would join the fleet in the next decade, would help the IAF meet the national aspirations.

Asked about the FGFA, Naik said he expected it to be inducted in the Air Force by 2017 and equated it with the F-22 Raptor of the US Air Force which is already operational.

"I wish I could join the Air Force again to fly these modern aircraft," added Naik, who will reach superannuation next year.

Read more: Security scenario alarming, says IAF chief - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Security-scenario-alarming-says-IAF-chief/articleshow/6712042.cms#ixzz11seXTBMD

 

“PAF s’ Bomber Wing of B-57s”

A tribute to those B-57s pilots & navigators, Who executed night bombing missions flying at tree top level on pitch dark nights, carried the war deep into the enemy's heartland, few lionhearted could not return to motherland and embraced shahadat in the line of duty leaving behind a supreme tradition alive “Mission First.’


Preamble:-

Its an untold story of Pakistan Air Force s’ No 31 Bomber Wing of B-57s comprising No 7th & 8th Squadrons during 1965 & 1971 Indo-Pak Wars. Although long before the outbreak of hostilities in 1971, No 31 Bomber Wing was non existent and the valiant No 8th Squadron had also been number plated because of US Government embargo on military hardware and supplies, but its pilots & navigators took active part by joining No 7th Squadron in the war of 1971, operating from Masroor and Mianwali air bases.

In August 1982, finally all the remaining B-57s of No 7th Squadron were transferred to No 2 Squadron, adding yet role of night interdiction and special missions to unit s’ assignment until retirement this reliable workhorse B-57 from meritorious service from PAF. Another chapter has been added to highlight the commendable performance and missions of low profile, stealth unit of PAF s’ No 24th Elint Squadron operating RB-57Fs & RB-57Bs during and after war of 1965.

The B-57 Bomber nicknamed “Baba” has been serving the Pakistan Air Force for more than 25 years as a weapons delivery platform, conventional weapons bomber, high altitude aerial reconnaissance, electronic counter & support measures and tow target aircraft as well as being the mainstay for the Air Force. This story is dedicated to the bold and devoted aircrew, maintenance and support personnel of the bomber wing who knew the dream workhorse B-57 and were part of its sorties and missions during peace and wars of 1965 and 1971. It is a beginning with the hope that those who were a part of the Bomber Wing will contribute to the growth of this effort by providing original photos and record of the missions. Since another chapter about the Indo-Pak war of 1971 is under process.

USAF & Operational Background of Martin B-57Bs:-

The Pakistan Air Force was one of the major users of the B-57s except USAF,NASA and National Republic of China Air Force.(Taiwan) The US Air Force considered the B-57B inadequate for the night intruder role and Martin puting all aircraft through an extensive avionics upgrade. Regardless, by the end of 1957 the USAF tactical squadrons were being re-equipped with supersonic F-100 Super Sabres. The complete retirement was delayed, however, by the start of the Vietnam War.The deployment of B-57Bs from 8th and 13th Bomb Squadrons to Bien Hoa began with three aircraft lost in collisions on arrival. An additional five aircraft were destroyed with another 15 damaged by a Viet Cong mortar attack in November 1964. The first combat mission by the US Air Force s’ B-57Bs was not flown until 19 February 1965, with the first excursion into North Vietnam taking place on 2 March as part of Operation Rolling Thunder.

The aircraft typically carried 9 x 500 lb (227 kg) bombs in the bomb bay and 4 x 750 lb (340 kg) bombs under the wings. In April 1965, B-57Bs began flying night intruder missions supported by C-123 Provider or C-130 Hercules flare ships and EF-10B Skyknight electronic warfare aircraft. On missions extending into North Vietnam, B-57Bs carried their own flares. On 16 May 1965, an armed B-57B exploded on the runway at Bien Hoa setting off a chain reaction that destroyed ten other aircraft, eleven A-1 Skyraiders, and one F-8 Crusader. Due to combat attrition, in October 1966 B-57Bs were transferred to Phan Rang where they supported operations in the Iron Triangle along with Australian Canberra B.20s. The aircraft also continued to fly night interdiction missions against the Ho Chi Minh trail. Of the USAF s’ 94 B-57Bs deployed to Southeast Asia, 51 were lost in combat and only 9 were still flying by 1969. As the result, the all B-57Bs were withdrawn from USAF s’service.

Two RB-57As were used by the National Republic of China Air Force for reconnaissance missions over People's Republic of China. One of these was shot down by a Chinese Air Force MiG-19 on 18th February1958. Two other RB-57As were used by the Federal Aviation Administration to plan high-altitude airways for the upcoming jet passenger aircraft.

US Military Aid Package:-

During a visit to Pakistan, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised to provide the government of Pakistan with modern jet bombers under US Military Aid Package.

The No 31st Bomber Wing to formed 7th & 8th Bomber Squadrons:-

PAF s’ B-57 Bombers force began its maiden flight joining Air Force inventory since 27th November,1959. Whereas, twenty four B-57Bs and two B-57Cs inactivated from US Air Force 345th Tactical Bomber Group at Langley AFB in Virginia were ferried to Mauripur air base in Karachi, Pakistan to form the 7th & 8th Bomber Squadrons of the 31st Bomber Wing of the Pakistan Air Force on 11th May 1960.

Our Air Force made very extensive operational use of the B-57B bomber in two wars with India. In the Indo-Pak War of 1965,B-57s force logged 195 operational sorties, dropping over 600 tons of bombs against IAF air bases,radar stations and military targets. Three B-57s of the Bomber Wing were lost in action but out of these, only one due to enemy action. First B-57 s’piloted by Squadron Leader Alam Siddiqui & navigator Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi dived into the sea over IAF air base Jamnagar misjudging the height through the thin layers of clouds or getting spatially disoriented, on the early night of 7th September. The 2nd B-57 was shot down over IAF air base Adampur piloted by Flt.Lt.Altaf Sheikh & navigator Flt. Lt. Bashir Chaudhy through enemy ack ack batteries on 14th September .The 3rd B-57 piloted by Flt.Lt Mehmood Butt & navigator Flt. L.t Khalid crashed on the Risalpur air base runway because of bad weather on 17th September.

Whereas one RB-57B electronics intelligence aircraft piloted by Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24th Elint Squadron was shot down by Pakistan Army s’ ack ack battery during a bombing practice mission on a PAF s’ radar unit near Rahwali,Gujranwala. In the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, There was a higher attrition rate with at least five B-57s being put out of service by the end of the war.

“Martin B-57B in PAF ”

The US Glenn. L. Martin B-57B a first generation of jet bomber was a tandem 2 seat, twin engines, night intruder or tactical, all weather long-range bomber, its crew consisted of a pilot and a navigator, carrying a payload of 56 rockets, 4 x 20mm cannons and 8000 lbs. of bombs, 2 turbo jets engines, fired by cartridge starters powered the aircraft. It was very large in size, having a length and wingspan of 65 feet, which meant virtually no maneuverability. Its speed was 570 mph, ceiling height 45,000 feet and ferry range 2656 miles with max load. The PAF B-57s pilots prefer to fly hardly above 200-500 feet in order to avoid enemy radar detection during wars of 1965 and 1971.

However, once over the IAF targets they would pull up to about 7000-8000 feet to make an accurate dive position on targets, from where they would release bombs over the targets with pin point accuracy and precision.

RB-1A all-weather bombing system for PAF s’B-57s:-

At first, these bombers were not equipped with an all-weather bombing system as had been originally planned. From 1963, all of the PAF s’ B-57Bs were retrofitted with the RB-1A all-weather bombing system which gave them a somewhat longer nose shape than that of standard USAF B-57Bs. Some of the B-57s were also fitted with under wing points for the carriage of four extra fuel tanks, which gave them sufficient range to reach distant military targets well inside India.

The No 24th Electronic Intelligence Squadron:-

In addition, two General Dynamics/Martin-RB-57Fs ultra-high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were also supplied to Pakistan Air Force in the early 1960s. The RB-57Fs was known as droopy because of enormous 122 ft wingspan and capable to fly at the cruising height of 80,000 ft beyond the range of enemy interceptors and SAMs of that period. This was state of art highly specialized aircraft for ECM/ESM missions. The No 24th Elint squadron operated the RB-57Fs along with two RB-57Bs for electronic counter & support measures missions and photographic surveillance missions against IAF during and after the war of 1965.These aircraft extensively over flew most of the IAF air bases up to Ambala at the height of 67000ft or more to carry out monitoring/ reconnaissance missions. The following missions were assigned to the No 24 Elint squadron deployed at Peshawar air base:-

Operational Missions Profile:-

1. Low level homing on to enemy radars.

2. Monitoring of enemy radars for which daily surveillance was kept up to locate their grid reference as well as any change.

3. Monitoring & Jamming of enemy radio channels particularly for GCI transmissions.

Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal SJ was the first OC, who later embraced shahadat being Officer Commanding of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his navigator Saifullah Lodhi SJ during a bombing practice mission on a PAF s’radar unit near Rahwali in the 1965 War.

Since the start of the 1965 war. The PAF s’ F-86s Sabre wing operating from Sargodha air base tried to neutralize the IAF Amritsar radar, but could not deliver accurate attacks due to difficulty experienced in triangulating the exact location of the radar system. Squadron Leader Iqbal floated a novel idea of locating the enemy radar by utilizing the electronic devices fitted RB-57 aircraft. He led in his electronic intelligence RB-57 as a pathfinder, a formation of four B-57s to Amritsar radar on a daylight bombing mission and did not seem to be satisfied with the practical results.

He, therefore, decided to make some practice attacks on a PAF s’ radar station deployed at Rahwali, near Gujranwala. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24 Elint Squadron and his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi were busy in making low dive bombing practice on radar station. The Army ack ack unit deployed around radar station opened fire on diving B-57 and shot it down, killing both the pilot and navigator. A first rate thorough professional, dedicated and lion hearted pioneer OC of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his outstanding professional navigator Saifullah Lodhi embraced shahadat during mid stream of the war. Both were awarded well deserved Sitara-e-Jurat posthumously. A very tragic loss of invaluable lives of pilot and navigator along with a specilized RB-57 aircraft and an incident that could have been avoided through timely liasion with Air Force and Army ack ack regiment.

If wing operation officer Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed SJ of F-86 Sabre wing would shed his blood for his noble air strike mission to destroy IAF radar station at Amritsar, Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal SJ OC of No 24 Elint Squadron and his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi SJ were also there to shed their blood in the line of the duty.

Nest of the Eagles:-

Since its maiden flight, the No 31 Bomber Wing of B-57s along with its No 7 & 8 Squadrons was deployed at Mauripur air base, Karachi and was assigned the strategic role of airfield night bombing strikes and deep interdiction night missions against numerically superior Indian Air Force bases and military installations during war with India.

Mission & Scope of the B-57s Bomber Wing:-

The paramount mission of the B-57s Bomber Wing night bombing operations was to deny the numerically superior Indian Air Force, the operational utilization of its massive potential air power destroying air bases, runways, hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps and radar installations from where IAF was supposed to streamline air war efforts by launching fighter and bomber aircraft during eventual war with Pakistan. Since IAF maintained a very vast network of major airbases integrated with Russian state of art P-35 three dimension radar systems with Early Warning & GCI facilities along with the adjoining borders with enemy and was quite capable to extend its war efforts through flexible mode by virtue its geographical depth and large airfields infrastructure. A bold and offensive meticulous operational doctrine under The PAF Air War Plan of June 1962 for bomber wing was worked out by the Air Headquarters to counter the numerically superior IAF to fight the air war of Pakistan, keeping in the mind to take bold initiative on the outbreak of Indo-Pak war by launching sustained and wide spread night bombing sorties after sorties over the enemy air bases and military targets, would ultimately bottle up major portion of the Indian Air Force in defensive deployment. It was a strategic offensive plan of PAF s’ Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, when numerical superiority was heavily tilted in favour of the enemy. The No 31 Bomber Wing being strategic wing of PAF, raised and trained for ultimate war with India during sixties under the dynamic and visionary leadership of its then Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan. As an Air Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, whose sterling credentials and brand name has been marked on the PAF since August 15, 1947. A youngest inspiring air force commander with strategic vision and a distinguished jet fighter pilot for newly born Air Force.

Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan a chief architect of Pakistan Air Force:-

Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan has been chief architect of our modern fighter jet Air Force from teeth, to tail. Since July 1957 during his tenure, The air force inducted Korean battle tested fighter bomber F-86s, Martin B-57s bombers, supersonic F-104s star fighter, Hercules C-130s, advanced training jets T-33s and basic training jets T-37s, for search and rescue operations Sikorsky H-19D helicopters and SA-16 Albatross as well modern & state of art high powered early warning and surveillance radar systems of FPS-6 (height finder) & FPS-20 (surveillance).

PAF on the path of Jet technology transformation:-

The Air Force had also begun inducting sidewinder air-to-air missiles (GAR-8 series) to its jet interceptor-fighters force. The entire infrastructure of the Air Force was planned to transforming from propeller aircraft force to jet aircraft force, an advanced technology transformation ahead of its time in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent.

Apart from induction of the US origin hi-tech military hardware in the Air Force, The Air Chief and his Air Staff undertook the uphill task to transforming PAF s’ propeller aircraft force into a technologically advanced fighter jet air force in accordance with professional and operational training standards of the US Air Force on war footings. The US Air Force also provided its F-86 Sabre jets Vs MIGs air combat tactics/strategy profiles during Korean War of 1950-53 through bilateral training programs held in USA, West Germany and Pakistan. The key factor of this gigantic transformation program for the PAF was professional excellence through logging of highest jet flying hours by the fighter-bomber pilots, while maintaining highest degree of flight safety.

Operational Standards for the Air Force:-

Air Marshal Asghar Khan himself played the role model of the fighter pilot by flying/checking out each and every aircraft including B-57 under his command setting finest operational standards for the air force. Thereby raising Squadrons after Squadron, as well imparting rigorous and perpetual professional gigantic training program for this newly advanced fighter jet air force in line with USAF ‘s standards. The ultimate milestone worked out by Air Headquarters, getting its air force ever ready for eventual war on Kashmir with numerically superior Indian Air Force. The professional excellence in fighter flying of the PAF was duly acknowledged by the USAF, when state of art mach- 2 air superiority fighter F-104 were provided to PAF, although our air force was the only non NATO Air Force declared qualified to operate these advanced hi-tech fighter aircraft.

The PAF had become razor sharp air war machine, ever ready to face any eventuality during war and peace, long before Air Marshal Asghar Khan got retired from Air Force in July 1965 handing over his command to another accomplished air warrior and bomber pilot of No 7th dive bomber Squadron Burma front bombing missions famed Air Marshal M Nur Khan.

As Commander in Chief Air Marshal Nur Khan would command this highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional air force during Indo-Pak war of 1965.

The ambitious night bombing training program of No 31 Bomber wing was remained under specific and direct supervision of Air Marshal Asghar Khan and his air staff. The selection criteria entailed hand picked and hard task commanding officers of the Air Force for this premiere wing.

Gallery of Wing OCs:-

An Orion of star pilots detailed by the Air Headquarters for wing ever ready to go for action, beyond the call of the duty during war and peace, providing a dynamic leadership nucleus for professional and purpose built bomber wing training. The leaders No 31 Bomber Wing included Air Commodore Khaqan Abbasi, Air Commodore Nazir Latif, Air Vice Marshal A.H.Qureshi, Group Captain M.A. Dogar, Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar A. Khan, Air Vice Marshal Mehmood Akhtar Bokhari and Air Commodore Rais A. Rafi.

Gallery of Pilots & Navigators:-

The Bomber Wing s’ No 7 & 8 Squadrons were commanded by including Squadron Leaders of 7th Squadron Ayaz A. Khan (being the first OC), A.M.Lodhie, A. Shamim, Najeeb A. Khan, M.Akhtar, S.A.Rahman, Wing Commanders S.A.Ansari and M.Yunis and Squadron Leaders of 8th Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (being the first OC), who later embraced shahadat being Officer Commanding of No 24 Elint Squadron in the 1965 War, S.A.Ansari, Rais A. Rafi, M.Zaman, M.K.Bashar as well as with a large number of Akhtars, Altafs, Alams, Aslams, Bashirs, Bashars, Basits, Bukharis, Butts, Ghauris, Harneys, Iftikhars, Irfans. Khalids, Khans, Khusros, Kamals Mehmoods, Osmans, Peters, Qureshis, Shabbirs, Shams, Shoaibs, and Sikandar, etc. These brave and dedicated bomber pilots were commanding the wing and its squadrons through cockpit, following the first flying tradition of the PAF “The Commander is up front”!

Bomber Wing Training Profiles:-

The professional excellence and rigorous flying training profiles during day and night by The No 31 Bomber Wing and its crew culminated in the shape of undertaking of maximum number of night bombing sorties/missions after mission against heavily defended air bases of IAF and other military installations during the wars of 1965 and 1971.

The extensive night low –level flying and weapons delivery training involved low level strikes from 1000ft above the ground level and dive bombing attacks from 8000 ft, releasing weapons at 4000ft and recovery at 2000ft. The night training program entailed through out night achieving 50% of the monthly flying hours done at night. The extensive day and night training profiles transformed B-57s a formidable force for its operational missions. Thereby maintaining its best turn around time by two B-57 bomber squadrons.

Highest Degree of Turn Around:

To achieve the highest degree of turn around by a heavy bomber B-57 in a couple of hours and to keep the bomber wing of 22 aircraft that was flying more than 2-3 sorties per aircraft per night in the air field strike missions, required tremendous technical skills and best coordinated war efforts by the bomber personnel as well the technical & logistics ground personnel of the wing deployed around the country on distant air bases of PAF. i.e. at Peshawar, Mauripur, Samungli, Risalpur and Sargodha etc.

Operational Methodology:-

As major night operations program by the B-57s was conducted through Peshawar air base since 6th September, every bomber formation leaving for bombing mission against IAF air bases was suppose to return to alternate air base to ensure safety to rearm and refuel, and then to strike again before returning to base or to another safe air base. The standard operational procedure enabled B-57s force to be prepared to attack their targets night after night creating dynamic approach through flexible mode. By arriving over their targets in a stream at intervals of about 15-20 minutes, the B-57s certainly succeeded in hitting hard the IAF air bases again and again. As Peshawar and Risalpur air bases were also considered too vulnerable to IAF attacks during the nights. Therefore, Samungali and Mauripur air bases were also utilized for turn around.

A successful and accurate night bombing mission is a reflection of overall bomber wing service efficiency-direct or in-direct flying up to targets through ever-vigilant enemy ack ack guns and missiles and fine blend of integration with friendly GCI radar system, navigation, communication, maintenance & technical personnel and bomber pilots & navigators etc.

Serviceability of Bomber Wing:-

At 1800 hours evening of the 6th September 1965,when first formation of six B-57s fully armed with 4x1000lb bombs, 56x2.75” rockets and full load of 4x20 mm cannons took off from air force base Mauripur setting its course for IAF base Jamnagar to undertake the first bombing mission against enemy. The serviceability of our bomber wing was around 99% and technical & logistics ground personnel of the wing maintained it through out the war. An engineering magic by those unsung heroes of the bomber wing under the command of Squadron Leader Aurangzeb Malik. Although it might have taken a couple of hours to patch up the holes in one or two of aircraft, at no stage was any of the B-57 aircraft was unserviceable. Excluding the aircraft losses and damages due to enemy or friendly ack ack fire or crashes. Never did the wing had the situation of bomber pilots waiting for the B-57s for next due operational sortie against enemy targets. A commendable chapter recorded by the wing and its technical & logistics personnel in the annals of air warfare.

Battle for Lahore and The F-86s Force strikes back:-

When the Indian Army launched multiple ground attacks on Lahore in the early hours of 6th September 1965.The war was declared and Government of Pakistan ordered PAF s’ High Command to carry out air war operations accordingly. The PAF s’ F-86s Force operating from Peshawar and Sargodha air bases responded swiftly by strafing and rocketing against advancing columns of Indian army s’ armor, artillery and infantry units from Batapur- Wagah-Atari axis. Since morning till evening containing enemy surprise offensive operations against Lahore, while Pakistan Army deployed in strength on BRB canal banks.

The No 31 Bomber Wing & Night Bombing Missions Profile:-

Now The No 31 Bomber Wing along with its No 7 & 8 Squadrons rose to the occasion in accordance with its pre defined bombing operational doctrine worked out under the PAF Air War Plan of June 1965 with imaginative vision and intricate planning. The Wing operated as an independent and self-supporting arm of the air force undertaking night bombing missions after mission against IAF base Jamnagar to Jodhpur, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Sirsa, Srinagar and Ambala, from the shores of the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalayas.

The night bombing campaign started by the wing on the dusk of 6th September by a formation of six B-57s dropping 24,000 lbs. of bombs and rockets on the IAF airbase Jamnagar and followed by IAF air base Adampur lasted till the last close support bombing mission undertaken by The Bomber Wing against Indian Army at Wagah-Atari axis on 22nd September 1965. B-57Bs force of 22 aircraft undertook a total 195 missions of day and night dropping more than 600 tons of bombs against IAF targets as compared to an estimated 92 night bombing sorties against PAF targets by more than 60 IAF Canberras.

The First Bombing Mission against Indian Air Force:-

Although a major portion of the Bomber Wing was already shifted to Peshawar as per operational doctrine. The remaining six aircraft were waiting at Mauripur air base, then an order received to launch attacks against Jamnagar at 1800 hours on 6th September 1965. The Wing Commander A.H.Qureshi led his bomber force of six B-57s along with Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi, Squadron Leader Alam Siddiqui , Squadron Leader Ansari, Flt Lt Rashid & Flt Lt Amin Khalil from air force base Mauripur in southern sector by launching bombing mission against IAF base Jamnagar. They carried out the first bombing attack of the war against IAF by opening bombing account of the PAF, extensively damaging runways and hangars. Rockets were also fired to hit hangars and buildings. The formation returned successfully with out encountering enemy ack ack firing and any loss. The lone B-57 would repeat air strike mission one after another until morning against IAF Jamnagar. “A milkman shuttle service.”

“Catch Me if you can”

The Wing Operations Officer Squadron Leader M.Akhtar Bukhari apart from engagement with operational and administrative matters at the air base also undertook the highly dangerous night flying mission over Indian air space to test and monitor the night interception capability of the Indian Air Force.

After the start of the war with India, the PAF high command decided to check the night interception capability of the enemy air force during mid stream of the air battle by detailing lone B-57 flying over the Indian air space during the mid night. Valiant Sqn Ldr M.Akhtar Bukhari along with Flt Lt Basit volunteered to fly the mission impossible on the night of 8th September at high twelve hours.

The B-57 No 885 piloted by him took off from Mauripur air base around mid night @ high 12 hours and after attaining cruising height of 35,000 ft headed its course @ 400 knots /hour towards enemy borders for IAF s’ Jodhpur air base, then reaching the target orbited the enemy air base for few minutes and finally turning its direction to wards north over enemy territory over flying one enemy air base including Amritsar and Pathankot after another.The aircraft took 2 hours & 40 minutes from take off till landing.

The enemy air force through its high powered P-35 three dimension radar system with Early Warning & GCI facilities monitored the B-57 taking off from air force base Mauripur in the middle of the night over flying Indian air space for unknown mission from Jodhpur up to Pathankot and then heading for Peshawar. No enemy interceptor scrambled to check the B-57 in the mid stream of the night flying mission.

An open challenge was thrown to the trigger-happy interceptor-fighter pilots of the enemy for easy target, but enemy would not dare to intercept the highflying Eagle in the mid stream. Daredevil Sqn Ldr M.Akhtar Bukhari along with navigator Flt Lt Basit flew his assigned route/mission cool headedly over Indian air space and landed safely at air force base Peshawar, reporting back all clear. “ A night mission impossible.“

First Shaheeds of Bomber Wing:-

The Lionhearted Squadron Leader Shabir Alam Siddiqui & Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi would undertake bombing missions after mission with in first night against IAF base Jamnagar, to inflict maximum damages to the enemy ultimately embraced Shahadat during their 3rd sortie on the night of 6-7th September, by following the finest tradition of fighting falcons of PAF, serving air force and the motherland beyond the call of the duty. The first shaheeds of bomber wing in the line of the duty after F-86 Sabre wing first Shaheeds Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafique HJ along with Flt Lt. Yunas Hussain SJ in Halwara aerial combat!

Peshawar air base A Bomber Wing Nucleolus:-

The Wing Commander Nazir Latif was also leading his bomber force of sixteen B-57s along with Squadron Leader M.Akhtar and Squadron Leader Najeeb A. Khan from air force base Peshawar in northern sector. Which remained a bomber wing operational nucleolus through out the war. Thereby launching bombing missions after mission against IAF bases Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Sirsa, Srinagar and finally hard hitting night bombing mission Ambala would be undertaken by them.

“Najeeb hits hard IAF air base Adampur”

Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan led a formation of four B-57s taking off from air force base Peshawar in northern sector by launching first bombing mission against IAF Adampur. The enemy welcomed B-57 bomber force with illuminating runways ‘s lights. Leader Najeeb and his formation responded delivering bombs over the targets with pinpoint accuracy shocking the enemy with surprise, leaving behind a trail of smoke and fire engulfed Adampur air base.

As soon the Squadron Leader Najeeb s B-57s were returning to land at Peshawar, another B-57s formation led by Squadron Leader M.Akhtar was setting its course for IAF Pathankot. The formation flew at tree top level to evade enemy radar detection and pulled up 8000ft through the massive ack ack barrage. The airfield beacons were blinking to highlight its location.

The leader dropped bombs over runways and hangars and formation followed the action, extensively damaging runways and hangars. An enemy radio message was intercepted by the Pakistan Army signal intelligence “IAF air base Pathankot is burning, Please advance relief.”

Soon after arrival from IAF Adampur, another night bombing mission was assigned to Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan and his formation of four B-57s to hit hard Beas river bridge to disrupt an important military supply link for Indian Army and the formation pressed for the mission then and there. Although, bridge proved to be a futile night bombing target. No damage was reported.

A large scale night bombing mission program launched by the B-57 bomber wing originating from Peshawar and Mauripur airbases since 6th September, was getting its momentum through its head start from Jamnagar and Adampur air bases, moving up to Pathankot, Halwara and Jodhpur, carrying the war deep into the enemy's major airfields.

The frequency of the night bombing sorties was in progress with the passage of the time. Sooner, its scope and operational methodology will widen according to the rapidly changing scenario of the air war in favour of Pakistan Air Force.

Chawinda Tank Battle & B-57s Night Mission Samba:-

The Indian Army launched another Major ground offensive from Samba in Sialkot sector after Lahore front through Charwa-Gadgor-Chawinda Axis on 8th September 1965. Major attack was spearhead by leading Indian Army s’ pride 1st Armoured division along with two Motorized Infantry and one Mountain divisions backing up by massive Corps Artillery s’ shelling with ultimate mission to reach G.T. Road at Gujranwala cutting main railway lines and roads encircling Lahore front from northern access by passing Pakistan s’ 6th Armoured division, 24th Infantry brigade along with 4th Corps Artillery units deployed around Chawinda-Daska axis. Another diversionary ground attack was launched against Sialkot by 26th Indian Infantry division to engage 15th Infantry division defending Sialkot-Jammu main axis. Indian army units had also brought road & bridge construction equipments and specialized vehicles & boats to negotiate water obstacles, rivers and canals in the area. The enemy war plan, if that could have been operationally implemented in accordance to its strategic milestone, would have defeat the Pakistan Army in the ground battle.

The 25th Cavalry a premiere regiment of Patton (M-47) tanks under the command of Col. Nisar A.Khan SJ took the lead to bear the major brunt of enemy First Armoured Division along with 24th infantry brigade under the command of Brig. Abdul Ali Malik HJ and 4th corps artillery under the command of Brig. Amjad Ali Chaudhri HJ engaged advancing columns of vanguard armor units of the enemy with in 7-8 miles from border.

A major tank and artillery duel began and lasted day and night. A large number of enemy Centurion and Sherman tanks were destroyed and eight Centurion tanks captured in running condition by the 25th Cavalry during the first round of Chawinda battle. From one of the Indian tanks, A copy of operational plan for 16th Cavalry recovered. Heavy, medium and field guns & howitzers regiments of 4th Corps artillery deployed around Chawinda, Pasrur and Sialkot were delivering accurate shelling on advancing enemy tanks and infantry units thus containing them for further move. Our artillery engaged enemy targets from the battle field of Chawinda up to border and beyond visual range hitting hard enemy units deployed around Sialkot –Samba axis with dropping the shells of 200 lbs, 90 lbs, 80 lbs & 25 lbs in a very substantial and effective style.

The Indian Army 1st Corps Headquarters located at Samba 7 miles distance from Indo-Pak border, was controlling entire military operations for Chawinda battle. A large number of tanks, artillery and infantry units were assembled there to be launched for battle from Samba, a battle nucleolus point.

In the wake of the mounting pressure from Indian Army s’ large scale offensive operations against Sialkot and Chawinda sectors, Pakistan Army sought immediate air support missions from PAF high command against enemy concentrations around Samba. The bomber wing was tasked to carry out night bombing missions against Indian Army units deployed there on the night of 10th September 1965.

A B-57 s’ formation led by Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar took off to undertake the night close –support bombing mission around Samba to harass the enemy army throughout the night. Although, it was bright moon lit night, B-57s dropped flares from 5000ft altitude, maintaining R/T liaison with army ground liaison officer to identify the target areas.

The flares hit the mark reported by the GLO. Now, Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar responded with lightning speed by dropping bombs over the target and repeated the action up to 20 minutes, before B-57 exited the area. Another B-57 aircraft reached the scene and undertook the bombing mission over enemy concentrations. The B-57 bombing missions after mission continued the whole night of 10th/11th September, disturbing and harassing the Indian army units and thus preventing them from joining the battle of Chawinda.

In the morning valiant 17th,18th & 19th Squadrons of F-86s from Sargodha ans Peshawar would come to settle their balance with depleted units of enemy by strafing and rocketing through out the day. Advancing Indian Centurion & Sherman tanks were proved to be hot favorite shooting ground of the hovering F-86s at tree top level from dawn to dusk. The F-86s formations after formation remained there to take its due share of enemy ground targets under its dynamic Squadron Leader Butch Ahmed SJ who later embraced Shahadat during another ground attack mission against an ammunition carrying train at Gurdaspur railway station and Squadron Leader Azim Doudpota SJ from No 32 fighter wing operating from Sargodha air base.

Therefore, PAF s’ bomber wing B-57s along with its brother fighter bomber wings of F-86s played decisive role to contain the enemy army advance through Chawinda battle by effectively knocking out a large number of Tanks, Artillery guns and Infantry vehicles particularly 14th mountain division which was prepared to join the battle royal of Chawinda along with 1st Armoured division. The PAF s’ aircraft knocked out its fighting potential destroying vehicles, guns and fighting arms leaving in a very depleted condition not fit for any battle.

“Target Alpha”

IAF s’ high powered P-35 three dimension radar systems with Early warning & GCI facilities at Amritsar was a prime target for PAF, because of its strategic location on border near Lahore. Its call sign “Fish oil” The radar was posing direct threat to PAF air operations directing IAF air operations over West Pakistan.

Since the outbreak of Indo-Pak war, F-86s fight bomber wing from Sargodha air base operating along with No 24 Elint Squadron s’ RB-57s as pathfinder escorted by No 9 Squadron F-104s as top cover launched sustained air strikes to neutralize this target.

Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi embraced Shahadat during a practice mission for this vital target, his RB-57B was hit by friendly ack ack fire.

During a successful air strike undertaken by the F-86s on radar station, its wing operation officer Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed embraced shahadat and radar was extensively damaged for effective air operations on 11th September. However after some interval, Fish oil again back on the air to streamline Indian Air Force operations over West Pakistan. Meanwhile, the mission to destroy this radar was detailed to bomber wing. The C-in-C Air Marshal Nur Khan himself briefed pilots and navigators for the bombing mission against IAF radar station at Amritsar code named “Target Alpha”. The B-57s bombers struck successfully to the radar station. A formation of four B-57s led by Wing Commander Nazir Latif , dropped 28,000 lbs. of bombs on Amritsar Radar station with pin point accuracy and precision completely damaged the target on 12th September, leaving Indian Air Force with out any Early warning & GCI radar coverage for air operations.

First B-57 shot down by the IAF over Adampur air base:-

The daredevil Flt Lt Altaf Sheikh & Flt Lt Bashir Chaudhy would undertake bombing missions after mission since the first night of 6th September against heavily defended IAF bases, making two or three bombing runs to achieve accurate target hits but against the laid down procedure of single attack and quick egress. During his 13th bombing mission against Adampur, B-57 s’ bomb release system malfunctioned and bombs did not release, after many aborted attempts, Altaf decided to jettison the bombs en route to its air base. But he then again tried his luck to bomb IAF base Adampur, while in the dive, enemy ack ack shells hit the B-57. However Flt Lt Altaf & Flt Lt Bashir Chaudhy bailed out safely from downing aircraft and became POWs. The war history is made of those patriot air boys who rose to serve the air force and the motherland beyond the call of the duty, with out caring their personal safety and life. This was the first B-57 casualty claimed by the IAF on 14th September 1965.

“Mission Ambala”

IAF air base Ambala, which was among major operational bases of Canberra bomber force heavily defended with heavy and medium ack ack batteries and SAM-II missiles located an aerial distance of about 400 miles from Peshawar air base. It remained on top priority of the bombing target list by the B-57 bomber wing. A night bombing mission undertaken by Wing Commander Nazir Latif on 8th September aborted, The formation could not locate the target returned safely to the air base with out dropping bombs. Another night bombing mission against IAF air base Ambala renewed by highly experienced crews B-57s led by Squadron Leader Najeeb A. Khan with navigator Flt.Lt. William D. Harney and Wing Commander Nazir Latif with navigator Squadron Leader Auranzeb.

The B-57s formation delivered delay fuse bombs extensively damaging runways, hangars and airfield infrastructure on the night of 18th September. When B-57s were exiting from mission, Ambala airfield was ablaz through chain reaction of firework and blistering barrage of ack ack batteries.

“B-57 Bombing with Allah-o-Akbar”

Finally another highly dangerous night bombing mission against IAF Ambala was planned by the bomber wing and undertaken by B-57s highly experienced crews team led by Squadron Leader Najeeb OC No 7th Squadron & navigator Flg Officer Kamal, Squadron Leader Rafi OC No 8th Squadron & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar and Squadron Leader Feroz & navigator Squadron Leader Aurangzeb on the night of 21st September 1965.

Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) Air Commodore Rahim Khan was himself there to brief the mission Ambala to B-57s crew in detailed because of its prime significance. The low level dive-bombing angles, a safety insurance from radar controlled SAMs-II, but offered an acute risk to the bomber aircraft and pilots from blistering anti aircraft guns and heavy machine gun batteries deployed in and around Ambala air base.

But pilots and navigators of B-57s pressed for the mission flying with 360 nautical miles speed at 500ft above ground level in the moon light keeping total radio silence up to the target. While complete surprise was achieved by the leading B-57 piloted by Squadron Leader Najeeb & navigator Flg Officer Kamal, encountered no enemy ack ack shells from Ambala. In the bright moon light, IAF air base lay clearly visible before the B-57s crew, who could see the cars with their headlights on streaming along the road past the air base. A bomber pilot ‘s dream emerged true, the target was in sight offering perfect view and accurate delivery of bombs.

The B-57s formation struck the Ambala with lightning action delivering bombs with delay fuses through low level skip technique in the face of massive ack ack barrage and returned with flying colors. Squadron Leader Najeeb & Flg Officer Kamal, were first to hit the target blowing fuel dumps which illuminated the burning target from miles to mile, Squadron Leader Rais Rafi & Flt Lt. Akhtar ventured to hit hard the runways by accurate low level bombing. Squadron Leader Rafi while delivering bombs on runways kept the piper right on the targets raised “Allah-o-Akbar” and also pressed machine guns to hit some buildings on the runway and subsequently Squadron Leader Feroz & Squadron Leader Aurangzeb delivered another bomb load on the targets with devastating impact,leaving behind enemy Air Force in shock and surprise. A veritable inferno of fire and smoke engulfed the airfield. Enemy ack ack guns were firing at full fury also hit its own buildings during the air strike.

While on their way back, flying at full throttle en route to air base Squadron Leader Rais A. Rafi & Flt Lt. Akhtar were very apprehensive about their comrades Squadron Leader Feroz & Squadron Leader Aurangzeb. Both prayed humbly ”May God protect Feroz & Auranzeb” Meanwhile Squadron Leader Feroz voiced through R/T ”DCO” (duty carried out). A jubiliant mood prevailed among B-57 ‘s formation flying over Bhatinda. An enemy transport vehicles convoy became the target of trigger happy Squadron Leader Rais A. Rafi using cannons of the bomber. The exploding vehicles created another sensation and remaining rounds of the cannons were expended on Bhatinda railway station.
An intricate planning and skillful execution in flying and navigation as well as daredevil approach with surprise and professionalism were the keys to successful night bombing missions of the bomber wing through out the war.

An American magazine published a story that the Indian Air Force had lost 25 aircraft as a result of the PAF night bombing sorties against Ambala. However a clear message was given to the Indian leadership and IAF ‘s high command that PAF bomber wing was quite capable of delivering bombing missions at will any where against IAF and military targets around the country.

“B-57s for close support mission Wagah Atari”

Before the cease fire announcement with India on 22nd September 1965. Indian Army was concentrating its Armour, Artillery and Infantry units for a possible assault on the salient to consolidate its positions on the eastern bank of the BRB Canal. A task was assigned to Bomber Wing to prevent Indian Army reinforcements from reaching their targets. A formation of four B-57s, which dropped 28,000 lbs. of bombs on Indian Army artillery pieces and tanks deployment near Wagah-Atari axis. The bombs from the B-57s dropped 'in train' engulfed the enemy tanks, artillery guns and support vehicles camouflaged under the trees and in the bushes. Very few enemy officers and soldiers survived to escape Atari. This was the last bombing mission carried out by the bomber wing before the cease fire with India on 23rd September 1965.

Operational losses during the war of 1965:-

Three B-57s of the No 31st Bomber Wing were lost in action but out of these, only one due to enemy action. One RB-57B electronics intelligence aircraft of No 24th Elint was lost due to friendly ack ack fire.

Shaheeds Gallery:-

No 31st Bomber Wing:-

1. Squadron Leader Shabbir Alam Siddiqui (Pilot)

2. Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi (Navigator)

3. Flt. Lt. Mehmood Butt (Pilot)

4. Flt.Lt.A.S.Z.Khalid (Navigator)

No 24th Elint Squadron:-

1. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (Pilot)

2. Flt.Lt. Saifullah Lodhi (Navigator)

Gallantry Awards:-

The Government of Pakistan gallantry awards to the Bomber Wing & 24th Squadron for outstanding perforce in line of the duty.

No 31ST Bomber Wing:-

1. Squadron Leader Najeeb A.Khan OC No 7th Squadron (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

2. Squadron Leader Rais A.Rafi OC No 8th Squadron (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

3. Wing Commander Nazir Latif (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

4. Flt.Lt.Sikander M.Khan (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

5. Flt.Lt.Altaf Sheikh (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

7. Flt.Lt. Shams Ahmed (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

8. Squadron Leader Shuaib A.Khan (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ

9. Flt.Lt. William D.Harney (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

10. Flt.Lt.S.M.Akhtar (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

11. Flt.Lt. Iftikhar A. Ghori (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

12. Wing Commander Ayaz A, Khan (Pilot) Sitara-e-Basalat (SB)

13. Squadron Leader Aurangzeb Malik (Engg) Sitara-e-Basalat (SB)

No 24th Elint Squadron:-

1. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

2. Flt.Lt. Saifullah Lodhi (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

3. Squadron Leader Mir Abdul Rashid OC (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)

Strategic Victory:-

The strategic material out come of these night bombing missions carried out by the bomber wing made nerve shattering shock impact on IAF High Command moral, which was forced to retreat from major air force bases of Pathankot, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jamnagar, Sirsa, Srinagar and Adampur to rear air bases i.e Agra, Ambala and Hindon. The IAF High Command compelled to shift its priority offensive air operations to defensive air operations nevertheless its larger size and very big air defense infrastructure. The IAF could not launch massive night bomber operations by its larger Canberra bombers force against few PAF bases during the war and also failed to provide effective interdiction/air support missions to Indian Army at battlefields as acknowledged by the Indian Army Generals serving in Western Army Command during Indo-Pak war of 1965. The perpetual night bombing campaign exerted devastating effect on the morale of the IAF personnel. The material effect of fatigue caused to them was most pronounced on their air and ground crew while they were forced to keep shuttling in and out of air raid shelters and trenches.

Enemy s’ Acknowledgement:-

As Indian Army Lt. General Harbaksh Singh has mentioned in his book “War despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965.” There was no air support available from IAF during field battles with enemy on western front and IAF was forced to exit from its main and forward air bases for reasons best known to IAF s ‘ High Command. Our officers and jawans were witnessing PAF s’ fighter bombers commanding the skies from dawn to dusk for shelling and bombing around thirty minutes or more over the battle fields under the Indian Army Western Command areas.

The Indian Navy ‘s Vice Admiral Mihir Roy has also acknowledged in his book “War in the Indian Ocean” Perpetual bombing raids reported against IAF base Jamnagar by the PAF s’B-57s bombers since the evening of 6th September 1965.

An Overview of Balance Sheet:-

The numerically superior IAF Canberra Bomber Force was completely knocked out in all instruments of its war machine without registering any major breakthrough for the war of 1965.

The PAF bomber s’ Pilot/Navigator Vs IAF bomber s’ Pilot/Navigator.

Martin B-57 Bomber Force of 22 aircraft Vs English Electric Canberra B-58 Bomber Force of more than 60 aircraft.

No of Bombing Mission/Sorties -195 Vs No of Bombing Mission/Sorties –92.

PAF Bomber Command Vs IAF Bomber Command.

The PAF Bomber Wing of B-57s emerged victorious with flying colours during day and night bombing missions assigned by the Air Force and the Country by keeping the numerically superior enemy Air Force at bay. The Wing performed bigger assignments, not only holding its own, made concerted night and day air strikes deep into the enemy territory as well performing close support missions for Pakistan Army engaged in the field battles.

Qualitative Edge & Factors:-

The qualitative edge and factors enabled B-57 bomber wing to produced remarkable performance during the war:

1. The meticulous war planning contemplated over several years, operational readiness and periodic operational exercises at Squadron, Wing, Base and Air Force levels masterminded by the C-in-C PAF Air Marshal Asghar Khan.

2. The selection of best pilots to command combat Squadrons & Wing, uncompromising standard and merit criteria.
3. Years of perpetual and rigorous night & day operational training-in flying, navigation and bombing precision, proved to be a very vital link in the chain of success. During the war, as it turned out the bombing results were even better than in peacetime practice exercises. This was perhaps because the pilots & navigators were so proficient and concentrated all their flying efforts on achieving the maximum pinpoint accuracy and precision.
4. Martin B-57 one of the most versatile and reliable bomber of the time and being the only type of that category in the Air Force s’ inventory, the bomber pilots and navigators were able to fly it extensively day and nights and learned to exploit its capabilities up to the limits.

5. The Engineers & engineering staff were able to achieve high aircraft serviceability and reliability, to sustain healthy rates of highest flying hours in the Squadrons and Wing level.

6. The Maintenance chiefs and maintenance staff s’ commendable performance during the war operations was a prime factor as described in detailed earlier.

7. The B-57 s’ pilots and navigators young, dedicated, bold and hard taskmasters, a fine blend of national spirit with unparallel professionalism, their heroic performance during the battle week was above the board. Enemy s’ massive ack ack batteries, fighter interceptors and SAMs-II could not deter them to carry out their bombing missions after mission. They wrought such havoc in the numerically superior IAF s’ ranks that they had no stomach left for air battle.

8. As Air Marshal Nur Khan being the bomber pilot was fully aware about operational potential of the bomber wing. Therefore, the B-57 s’ bomber wing being the strategic arm of the PAF was remained under specific and direct supervision of Commander in Chief PAF and Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) during Indo-Pak war of 1965.A number of bombing missions were briefed to aircrews by the Air Marshal Nur Khan and Air Commodore Rahim Khan. Air Chief and his air staff presence during operational brief proved to be, a true source of inspiration and motivation during the week of the war for pilots and navigators leaving for the highly dangerous bombing missions.

In a modern jet age war, Bomber Wing s’ strategic breakthrough during the Indo-Pak War 1965, Which PAF capitalized and enjoyed was the result of bold and skillful tactical actions of its highly trained, motivated and disciplined air and ground crew possessing highest degree of professionalism and patriotism. The crew executed every dangerous mission believing in the uprightness of the National Cause and felt no Sacrifice too great for it.

Bibliography

1.”PAF BOMBER OPERATIONS 1965 & 1971 WARS” by Rais A. Rafi, Air Commodore SJ, a B-57 bomber pilot & decorated star of Indo-Pak Wars

2.“The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.”

3.” Battle for Pakistan” The Air War of 1965. by John Fricker

4.“B-57 THE INTREPID BOMBER OF PAF.”Defence Journal, Karachi by Hali Sultan M. Group Captain

5.Martin B-57 Canberra--The Complete Record, Robert C. Mikesh, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1995.

6.Canberra: The Operational Record, Robert Jackson, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.

7.The English Electric Canberra Mk.1 and IV, K. Munson, Aircraft In Profile, Doubleday, 1969

8.United States Military Aircraft Since 1909, Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.

9.Library of Congress Country Study--Pakistan
10.“War despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965” by: Lt. General Harbaksh Singh Indian Army

11. “War in the Indian Ocean” by: Vice Admiral Mihir Roy Indian Navy

Copyright © Arshad Hussain. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of Arshad Hussain is prohibited.

“6th September, 1965 & the PAF”

                                              (Painting by Rehan Siraj)

September 6th, 1965 will be live in our national history, a day to remember for valiant men & women, who sacrificed their day for our present and future days. When the PAF rose to meet the challenge of Indian military aggression by launching full scale air war in accordance with Air War Plan of June 29, 1965 by registering its name in the annals of air warfare against numerically superior Indian Air Force.


As the Indian Army started its advance against Lahore at about 1.00 am after mid night of 5/6 September, 1965 from the borders of Amritsar and its adjoining areas, presuming its vanguard armor and mechanized infantry units will easily over run the thinly deployed ground defense units of the Pak Army and Sutlej Rangers at Wagah, Burki and other border posts through multi roads network.

Some of the Pak Army units had just deployed at its battle positions, while others were on the roads heading to wards borders. When the Indian Army units at about 2/3 am launched its grand invasion of West Pakistan, The main advance began on three axes with the major thrust along with the GT Road aimed capturing the city of Lahore and where the Indian Army Chief General J. N. Chaudhry and his staff generals will celebrate victory at Lahore Gymkhana club in the evening.

The Indian military offensive seemed designed not merely to relieve pressure exerted by the advancing Pak army on Akhnur & Jammu axis, but to defeat the Pakistan armed forces by capturing major cities Lahore and Sialkot in the initial stage then shifting its advance for other areas.

Although long before the Indian ground offensive against West Pakistan was launched in the mid night of 5/6 September, the PAF s’ Air Commodore Aziz Ahmed head of the Indian Desk in Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had sent a red signal to all concerned that prior to the outbreak of war with India on 30th August, 1965:-

“An Indian attack outside Kashmir was imminent and listing detailed Indian Army movement from peace locations to its battle positions particularly mentioning Indian armoured division had been deployed in Jallunder since July 1965, where it could launch out in one of several battle points against West Pakistan.”

None at the government of Pakistan and Pak army high command level particularly C-in-C General Musa Khan and Chief of the General Staff Major General Sher Bahader took it seriously, except Air Marshal Nur Khan went away seriously convinced of the impending war with India. He therefore on 1st September, 1965 ordered the PAF to the highest state of alert.

This was the most significant strategic move made by the C-in-C of the PAF, whose merit would be determine through air victory against numerically superior Indian Air Force during Indo-Pak War with in first three crucial days of air war. A bold snap decision by the Air Marshal Nur Khan!

While the PAF increased its combat posture from day to day, the country s’ political leadership and the hierarchy of the Army, incredibly, continued to languish in the shade of the Foreign Office s’ assurance concerning escalation. A wishful school of thought was promoted by the Foreign Office prior launching of the operation Gibraltar that “it will be localize military venture with in limits and boundaries of occupied Kashmir and the Indian Army will not be able to counter it effectively there”. Therefore, No contingency plan in case of violent counter attack by the Indian Army against Pakistan was ever visualized during the planning phase of operation Gibraltar as a result of its ultimate reaction from enemy.

The Pakistani Leadership and Army had miscalculated the ultimate outcome of the operation Gibraltar. The political Indian Leadership was not prepared to treat the military venture in Kashmir as an issue isolated from Indo-Pak relationship in the wider sphere.

Meanwhile, Indian political leadership in the response to Pak Army s’ operation Gibraltar and Grand Salam in Jammu Kashmir areas, finally decided on September 1st , to put into motion her long standing plan of attacking West Pakistan at Lahore, Sialkot and Kasur with the ground invasion timed to materialize in the early hours of September 6th, 1965.

The Pakistan s’ High Commissioner in New Delhi, India Mian Arshad Hussain got the top secret details of the ground attack plan of the Indian Army against Lahore including exact H Hours of September 6th,1965 acting imaginatively communicated the entire details to the Foreign Office, Islamabad, Pakistan through Turkey s’ embassy in New Delhi, India. It was timely war warning alarm but again, No contingency action was taken by the Government of Pakistan.

On the night of 5th September there was a dinner hosted by the International Aid Agency in Lahore. The guests included GOC 10th Division Major General Sarfaraz Khan and some American aid officers from the border. The Americans crossed the border at Wagah between 8.00pm -9.00pm on the night of 5th September. They came in three civilian jeeps driven by Indians. The driver of one jeep made some excuse for going across the border to Indian side. The other two drivers jumped in. Under the circumstances it would reasonable to assume that drivers were on reconnaissance mission to check the deployment of Pakistani troops.

On the night of 5th/6th September HQ 10 Division checked with Military Operations Directorate before ordering move of troops. The duty officer in MO Directorate was Lt.Col. Happy Aslam. He said,” The Foreign Ministry will not give clearance. The GOC can, of course, use his own discretion.” The marching columns of the Pak Army arrived in battle locations from 03.30am-04.30am. 23 Field Artillery Regiment occupied its gun positions by 03.30am.

The first breaking news of the Indian army major assault against Lahore was also communicated to the PAF s’ Operational Headquarters, Rawalpindi from Lahore Airbase Commander Wing Commander Ayaz A Khan at about 4.00 am, which was received from a mobile observer wing deployed at Wagah to monitor the enemy air force s’ activities. This was the specialized PAF unit which witnessed first Indian Army s’ tank units advance on the GT Road and attacking rangers s’ posts during the mid night. Air Vice Marshal M Akhtar was detailed at night duty in Operational Air Headquarters, Rawalpindi sensing the ultimate war scenario with India, immediately informed President Ayub Khan as well calling to Air Marshal Nur Khan and the Army Chief General Musa Khan about Indian Army attacks against Lahore through hot lines.

Since, the PAF was a highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional air force since decade led by inspiring and dedicated professional leadership ever ready to take on the enemy air force during peace and war. That s’ why , the ever vigilant PAF geared into air war operations immediately after the Indian army started its major offensive against West Pakistan like a well oiled razor sharp air war machine. Every one in the Air Force, from high command level to the airmen level, was up on his toes and contributed his max towards the fulfillment of the PAF role in the air war beyond the call of the duty.

Success of an offensive or a defensive aerial mission is not simply due to the expertise of the pilot but it is the culmination of perfect team work of several branches and units including radar, communication, controllers, aircraft and pilots, maintenance and technical personnel.

During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the PAF was deployed against numerically superior enemy Air Force five/six times its size and enjoying the inventory of superior and faster aircraft; However the PAF rose to meet its enemy with courage, dash and initiative, achieving air superiority and ultimately taking the air war into the Indian territory during the first crucial days of 6th and 7th September, 1965.

On 6th September, The PAF s’ Combat Air Patrols (Caps) of two F-104s of No 9 Squadron armed with guns and sidewinder missiles were already airborne before dawn, making orbits over Chamb area. Sakesar GCI vectored the F-104s towards Ghakhar near Rahwali airfield, Wazirabad. Where the IAF s’ aircraft were targeting Lahore bound stationary “ Babu Train “ on the railway station.

The F-104s piloted by Flt Lt Aftab A Khan and his wingman Flt Lt Amjad H Khan reaching the scene made contact with 4 IAF s’ Mysteres aircraft, busily engaged in bombing and rocketing against train, killing innocent passengers including young Abida Toosi, a medical student of Fatima Jinnah Medical College, Lahore embraced shahadat in the air raid.

Although Flt Lt Amjad was soon forced to return Sargodha Airbase with a radio failure, but daredevil Flt Lt Aftab pressed for the mission to engage and target enemy Mysteres formation diving his aircraft in full afterburner at supersonic speed. The Indian aircraft promptly scattered and began to escape at low level. Aftab engaged one Mystere from 4-5,000 ft range and shoot it down with sidewinder missile.

Later on monitoring the All India Radio Sakesar was able to announce that one Mystere had been shot down, other badly damaged. This was the first aerial combat between PAF and the IAF, after the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. TheF-104s No 9 Squadron was first to engage the IAF in the aerial combat, as well Flt Lt Aftab A Khan credited with the world s’ first victories by a Mach 2 interceptor aircraft at the out set of the air war on 6th September.

Meanwhile, more formations of F-86s from Sargodha Airbase on a CAP were sent to engage 6 Hunters reported over Sialkot along one F-104. The enemy aircraft broke off with out aerial combat, leaving behind much needed closed support missions by the Air Force to the Pak Army battling on the borders.

Now at Peshawar Airbase, around more then two hundred miles away from Lahore, where six F-86s of No 19 Squadron was ready to airborne armed with guns and rockets since September 5th as per specific instructions of Air Marshal Nur Khan.

Meanwhile, a call received from Air Headquarters of launching the first air strike by the No 19 Squadron under the command of Squadron Leader Sajad Haider on the Indian Army around Lahore.

Sajad recalls “Though the sun was up in the morning of 6th September, the air was still bracingly cool at our airbase. The news of Indian military attacks against Lahore came as a thunderbolt to all of us and it worked up the fighter pilots into a vicious mood. Everyone was urged to go forward to safeguard his nation and country.


As we were ordered to launch air strike mission on the Indian Armour units advancing to wards Lahore along the Amritsar-Wagah GT Road, a jubilant mood prevailed among pilots for the first mission in the morning. Those who joined me on the mission were Flt Lt Arshad, Mohammad Akbar, Khalid Latif, Dilawar Hussain and Ghani Akbar.”

“Our F-86s were armed with rockets in addition to the six guns. We took off and leveled off at the pre-planned height before heading towards, Wagah, Lahore. Shortly afterward we were over the target area and went in as far as Amritsar. Turning back we spotted enemy vehicles of all sorts moving along the road crossing Wagah border, covered by the Sherman tanks. I also saw the now famous Omni Bus parked at the Wagah Custom Post which the Indian Army later paraded that day in the streets of Amritsar as the war trophy from Lahore. For a while the enemy did not see us orbiting overhead. But when they did it was a sight to see the soldiers and drivers jumping out to take cover leaving vehicles to fate.”

“ All pilots check your firing switches; hot; target in sight.”

As the second dragged on the Haider formation reached the pull up point and the six F-86s climbed steeply into the sky like darts getting ready for attack.

“I had by now dived in for attack and let go my first burst of rockets. My formation followed. I all we made six attack each, as our formation orbited over the targets at tree top level. By the time we had expended our guns and rockets and returning to our Airbase. We saw a litter of bonfires destroying dozens of Sherman tanks, cannons and army vehicles. “

It was an armour brigade task force group trying to cross the BRB Canal at Batapur bridge. The war diary of 10 Division defending Lahore led by Major General Sarfaraz Khan; recorded that “ at this crucial juncture appeared 6 PAF s’ F-86s and for 15-20 minutes wrought havac on enemy armour and infantry, who were advancing in the open road trying to cross the BRB canal.”

Famous Indian war historians P.Singh and Ravi Rikhye acknowledged vide book Fiza' ya,Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force: What few know is that the PAF also had a major role in stalling the Indian Army. But for the PAF s' No 19 Squadron , the weak Pakistan Army defence would have been overwhelmed and the Indian Army would have poured across the BRB Canal and into Lahore.

Dawn of 6th September, 1965 saw a formation of 6 F-86s of No 19 Squadron fully loaded with 5 inch rockets (a last minute premonition the night before, by Air Marshal Nur Khan the C-in-C, which paid rich dividends) flying on “Hot Patrol’. The moment the Air Defence Commander learnt of Indian Army’s advance towards Lahore, the 19 Squadron formation was diverted to stop the advancing Indian armour columns at Wagah. In twenty minutes of action, the Grand Trunk Road was littered with scores of burning tanks, armoured and soft vehicles. The 5 inch rockets had a devastating effect on the enemy armour. The formation led by Squadron Leader Sajad Haider with Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Flying Officers Khalid Latif, and Arshad Chaudhry brought the Indian attack to a dead halt.

After landing at Sargodha for re-fuelling, the formation rushed back to Peshawar to prepare for the dusk strike on Pathankot air base.

Continued:

Bibliography:

1. “The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.By: Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad.”

2.” Battle for Pakistan” The Air War of 1965. by: John Fricker

3. “The First Round” By Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, C-in-C, the Pakistan Air Force

4.” A History of the Pakistan Army” by: Col.Brian Cloughley

5. “Memoirs” by: Lt. General Gul Hassan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Army

6.” The Pakistan Army”War 1965 by: Maj General Shaukat Riza,

7. “Story of the PAF Heros” by: Mohammad Afzal

Copyright © Arshad Hussain. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of Arshad Hussain is prohibited.