Arabs-Israel Air War June,1967
By: Arshad Hussain
Political Background & Strategic Events which led towards War.
Aerial Battle of Israel Air Force & Syrian Air Force
April 7th The root cause of the war began to developed when Israel Air Force strafed and bombed Syrian Army s’ field guns shelling Israeli farmers in a demilitarized zone near Sea of Galilee, in the subsequent air battle between Israel Air Force and Syrian Air Force lost its 6 MIG Fighters. Egypt & Syria signed the mutual Defence Pact.
May 14th The Egyptian Army was reported by the foreign media advancing towards Suez Canal & Sinai from Cairo & adjacent areas. The Israel Government announced Red Alert for its armed forces including the Air Force and Armoured Divisions.
May 16th The Egyptian Government declared state of emergency placing the Army, Air Force and the Navy into defensive deployments on the Israeli frontiers.
May 17th- 18th The Jordanian, Kuwaiti & Syrian Forces were mobilized for deployments.
May 19th The UN Forces officially withdrawn from Gaza Strip.
May 19th Meanwhile, the Israel Air Force got well prepared to hit hard at numerically superior enemy Air Forces through offensive counter air operations on the ground & in the air and the Government approval through Israeli Cabinet was sought in advance. Egypt Air Force was the key target for air war plan of IAF.
Naval Blockade
May 22nd The Egyptian Navy imposed Naval Blockade of Straits of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba, banning the Israeli merchant & cargo ships as well all ships entering or leaving the Gulf of Aqaba.
May 23rd The Israel Government declared Egyptian Naval Blockade of Straits of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba as an act of War.
May 23rd The Egyptian Air Force s’ Mig-21s undertaking photo reconnaissance missions over flew at major IAF air bases from Dead Sea towards El Arish air base.
May 24th The US Navy s’6th Fleet/Carrier Group of about 50 warships deployed on patrolling in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Egypt & Jordan Mutual Defence Pact
May 30th President Nasser of Egypt & King Hussain of Jordan signed the Mutual Defence Pact in Cairo. The Strategic Alliance of both the countries proved to a curtain raiser of war, Now the Israel Government decided to retaliate with pre-emptive air strikes against major enemy Egypt on priority and subsequently other Arab countries.
Tel Aviv, Israel
June 1st The Israeli Government appointed General Moshe Dayan Minister for Defence a decorated star of 1956 Egypt-Israel war. Because the Israeli public demanded it. Iraq Air Force deployed its MIGs & Hawker Hunters in H-3 air base nearest to Israel.
June 2nd General Moshe Dayan told a correspondent of News of the World “The outcome of the war would be decided in the air.”
General Moshe Dayan, General Hod Air Chief of the IAF and Brigadier General Weizmann, among the few Israeli Military Generals who firmly represent a school of thought that their Air Force could destroy the Egypt Air Force and any other Arab Air Force in the air defence battle of Israel without Tel Aviv & other major cities subjected to enemy Air Force bombardment in the War and the Air Force is the highly cost effective arm for Israel to carry the war in enemy s’ heart.
June 3rd The Israeli Cabinet meeting in a secret session on the mid-night of June 3rd - June 4th released its final approval of pre-emptive air strikes by the Air Force & launching of ground attacks by the Army against Arab countries as on 5th June, 1967 in the early morning hours.
June 3rd The Israeli Government successfully camouflaging its aggressive designs issued a routine communiqué designed for use by Monday 5th June, 1967 s’ Newspapers & Media. “All OK & NORMAL”
June 3rd The western media & newspapers reported at the behest of Israeli media structured information plan “A large portion of the Israeli forces were sent on leave and were seen sporting on the beaches on Saturday & Sunday.”
June 3rd An Egyptian double secret agent in Tel Aviv sending back reports of Israeli Nation in a holiday mood in accordance with Israel s’ war plan.
June 4th Whereas, By the Sunday evening, IAF s’ Every Air Force General, Commanders, Pilots , Engineers & Technicians as well civilians working shoulders to shoulders knew that the next early morning they would at air war with Egypt Air Force in accordance with Israel s’ air war plan.
Cairo, Egypt Amman, Jordan & Damascus ,Syria
June 3rd On the other end, After many days of tension & anxiety among Government Circles in Cairo, Amman and Damascus were began to relax and felt that victory had been achieved without fighting a war with Israel. The Egyptian Government controlled Cairo Radio & Television network “Sout ul Arab” played a major role about this entitlement trap or so-called victory. Later on this propaganda proved to be a double edge sword for the Arab Governments & its People particularly the Kingdom of Jordan & its people.
Cairo Blue Night of June 4th, 1967
June 4th The majority of the Egyptian Air Force s’ pilots, combat commanders along with their Air Chief Air Marshal Mahmood Sidki and other high ranking officers were gathered in a leading night club of Cairo to enjoy striptease dances & whisky drink parties with beautiful ladies throughout the blue night of June 4th till the morning of 5th June celebrating this so-called victory against Israel Air Force. The party was exclusive for EAF personnel. During the climax of high 24 hours, An innovative game in the night club was announced by the owner of club as a chief host to highlight the victory celebrations among pilots by forming groups of women led by most beautiful dancer & men led by Air Marshal Mahmood as chief guest. Men posed as MIGs of Egyptian Air Force and women posed as Mirages of Israel Air Force and a battle game for victory over Mirages Vs MIGs started there in the candles light and continued the whole night. Around four hundred fighter pilots of MIGs & Sukhois & their seniors remained there to enjoy the long blue night game, were badly exhausted to report for duties to air force bases, radars located around Cairo and in Sinai desert to undertake combat flying & air defence missions in the early morning of June 5th, 1967.
In the morning after grand blue night party, Air Marshal Mahmood Sidki C-in-C, the Egypt Air Force and Field Marshal Hakim Amer C-in-C, the Egypt Army were scheduled to visit Egyptian Air Force s’ forward air bases and radar stations located in Sinai desert. EAF s’ Air Headquarters located in Cairo, issued orders to SAMs batteries & Ack Ack batteries around the Egypt not to open fire at any aircraft during this scheduled visit on the morning of June 5th, 1967.
Senior officers were almost on the roads to report offices around 9.00 A.M. Cairo time, A number of formation of MIGs-21 & 19 and SU-7s fully armed ready to take off waiting on ORP for fighter pilots to man them, but Egypt Air Force s’ aircraft were empty, except few student pilots and EAF s’ pilots were having breakfast in the mess. While the first IAF s’ formations after formation was making its way in the air, the entire high command of the Egypt Air Force and the Army was in the air on its way to inspect EAF s’ air bases & radars as well the Army units deployed in Sinai; to ensure the safety of VVIP aircraft heading to Sinai, the above orders issued to SAMs & Ack Ack batteries not to open fire at any aircraft during this scheduled visit. Since Egypt s’ AAA system was integrated with radars, therefore the EAF s’ radar network was also shut down.
This key information about the Egyptian Air Force s’ operational level and visit detail was immediately transmitted to Moss ad s’ Headquarters in Tel Aviv by the owner of the night club of Cairo before boarding a passenger aircraft of Italian Air Line A Italia leaving for Rome in the early morning of June 5th, 1967. As Moss ad was running and funding his night club in the posh area of Cairo since long time. The owner was a well known high profile figure among Egypt s’ armed forces circles and a number of personnel from Air Force, Army and Navy were at his pay roll to exchange sensitive information & data required by the Moss ad. Men s’ Lust for women, wine & wealth eroded moral character and integrity among them. Where Money can manage anything for them was the thumb rule of espionage game contemplated by Israel Intelligence Agency “Moss ad”!
The owner of the club was, An Israeli agent/spy master. His intelligence communication network was very actively transmitting on line information about the Egypt Air Force and the Egypt Army to Moss ad. Although, Egyptian Air Force s’ counter communication intelligence triangulated its secret transmission in that night club on the night of June 4th and A contingent of air force police was detailed to arrest the Israeli spy master. However, the spy master successfully secured his neck from its clutches with the timely intervention by the Air Marshal Mahmood Sidki during the mid stream of the blue night party.
So the Israeli air war plan had successfully achieved complete surprise and its objective, The ultimate outcome of the war would be the surprise & pre-emptive air strikes against numerically superior Egypt Air Force in the early morning of June 5th, 1967 at about 9.00 A.M Cairo time and 8.00 A.M Tel Aviv Time.
Air Battle Deployments before June 5th, 1967
Israel Air Force Vs Arab Air Forces (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan & Lebanon)
Israel Air Force: 240 Combat Aircraft & 60 Trainer Aircraft= 300 Aircraft
Mirage-IIIs, Mysteres,Vaotours, Ouragans, Fouga-Magister
Trainers & C-130s
Egypt Air Force: 450 Combat Aircraft & 70 Trainer Aircraft= 520 Aircraft
MIGs-21s, 19s,17s & 15s, SU-7s,Bomber TU-16s & IL-28s MIGs-15
Trainers, Cargo AN-12s & Helicopters MI-4s & 6s
Syria Air Force: 120 Combat Aircraft & 40 Trainer Aircraft= 160 Aircraft
MIGs-21s, 19s & 17s, SU-7s, Bomber IL-28s,MIGs-15
Trainers, Cargo AN-12s & Helicopters MI-4s & 6s
Iraq Air Force: 200 Combat Aircraft & 50 Trainer Aircraft= 250 Aircraft
MIGs-21s, 19s, & 17s Hawker Hunter, Bomber TU-16s & IL-28s
MIGs-15s Trainers, Cargo AN-12s & Helicopters MI-4s & 6s
Jordan Air Force: 40 Combat Aircraft Hawker Hunters
Lebanon Air Force: 18 Combat Aircraft Hawker Hunters
Final Tally
IAF s’ 300 aircraft = Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan & Lebanon Air Forces s’ 988 aircraft
IAF s’ Air Strategy
The IAF s’ Air Strategy before the air war of 1967,was carefully contemplated and up dated based on the two key areas of the Air War Plan.
Counter Air Operation
The strategic aim of counter air operation was to achieve the desired level of control of the air at the outset of the hostilities. In the first phase of the air war in which entire Air Force was detailed with counter air operations against Egypt Air Force and subsequently shifting its balance towards Syria Air Force, Iraq Air Force and Jordan Air Force etc.
Anti Surface Force Operation
The strategic aim of anti surface force operation was to deprive Egyptian ,Syrian Iraqi & Jordanian Armies needed to occupy the territories of Israel on all fronts.
Operational Methodology
The IAF, as part of the force –mix was required to achieve complete air superiority through counter air operation against Egypt Air Force. The prime objective of the air strike was to make enemy s’ runways unusable and destroy as many EAF s’ MIG-21s as possible. As the MIG-21s was the only air superiority aircraft which could effectively prevent the IAF achieving its strategic objective to achieve complete air superiority through counter air operation against EAF s’ air bases in the initial round of the air battle.
The forty Mirage-IIIs fighter bombers at 0745 A.M. Tel Aviv & 0845 A.M. Cairo time on the morning 5th June the first wave of the IAF air strike went out and directed against ten airfields of EAF named El Arish, Gebel Libni, Bir Gifgafa, Bir Thamada, Abu Sueir, Karbit, Inchas, Cairo West, Ben Suief and Fayid.
0745 A.M. Tel Aviv ( Israel Standard Time) & 0845 A.M. Cairo time ( Egypt Standard Time). Why 0745 AM was selected by the IAF to carry out air strikes against EAF s’air bases & radars rather than 0800 or 0815 ? Because Egyptians get to their offices at about 0900 AM. Pre-emptive air strikes 15 minutes before that time would bogged down Air Force s’ Commanders and the Army Generals on the way to Headquarters and Pilots and airmen on the way to air bases and other units.
At the time of year in June, there is a morning mist much over of the River Nile, the Delta and the Suez Canal. By 0730 the mist has just about dispersed. Around 0800 the weather is usually at its optimum. The visibility is at its best because of the angle of the Sun, and the air is at stillest, which is important when it matters to dropping bombs accurately on runways by IAF.
Since IAF s’ pilots & navigators had to on the deck at least three hours before getting airborne for first air strike at 0745; that would have meant their getting up at about 0345. By the evening of the first day of the air war they would possibly have no sleep for 24-36 hours with the whole night and possibly the next day of air operations ahead of them.
The EAF state of the alert would have been past. When no air attacks by the IAF had materialized within two –three hours after dawn the Air Force would more than likely have lessened their air defence alert of several formations of MIG-21s & 19s & SU-7s waiting ORP at the end of the runways on 5 minutes alert since dawn every day and switched off some of their radar scanners around Cairo and Sinai desert.
Whereas Egypt Air Force was flying one or two formations of MIGs-21 on air defence alert orbiting over its air bases, since the dawn. Most likely time for an enemy Air Force to attack air bases. EAF s’MIG-21s s’ flying time & endurance was carefully calculated by the planning staff of the IAF monitoring through Early Warning Radars since May 14, 1967.The anticipated landing time of the enemy aircraft formations on air defence would safely be worked out in advance even through stop watch.
Therefore, IAF s’ High Command worked out it safe to assume that by around 0730
Tel Aviv time & 0830 Cairo time, the enemy Air Force had lowered its guards.
The attack time frame was calculated very carefully and pre-determined in advance, so that each formation will carry out air attacks against each enemy air base simultaneously.
The striking force/formations were instructed to fly at tree top level to avoid radar detection and to achieve maximum surprise.
Each striking formation consists of four fighter bombers flying in pairs.
Major Events & Operational Overview of IAF s’ Pre-emptive Air Strike plans
Israel Air Force s’ Chief General Hod along with Brigadier General Weizmann was in the Operational Command Headquarters located some where beneath the ground. General Moshe Dayan, Minister for Defence was also there to witness the head start of the Air war launched under code named “Operation Moked” by the IAF at 0745 A.M. Tel Aviv ( Israel Standard Time).
When the last formations of the EAF s’ jets early morning patrols got airborne and appeared on IAF s’ High Powered Early Warning Radar Network s’ Large Screens. General Hod immediately pressed his stopwatch. He knew very well how long the MIG-21 can stay airborne by 0745 hours, the MIG-21s formation would be almost out of fuel and on the point of landing.
The first wave of the IAF air strike formations of forty Mirage-IIIs fighter bombers at 0745 A.M. Tel Aviv & 0845 A.M. Cairo time on the morning of 5th June took off and headed against ten airfields of EAF named El Arish, GebelLibni, Bir Gifgafa, Bir Thamada, Abu Sueir, Karbit, Inchas, Cairo West, Ben Suief and Fayid. As the first strike force struck the enemy targets in Egypt as per mission, the second force of forty aircraft was already on its way and the third force of forty aircraft had just got airborne. Each force was flying spaced at 10-minutes intervals.
Each formation of four aircraft was allotted seven minutes over its targets enough for 3-4 runs, one bombing run and 2-3 strafing runs. An extra three minutes were allowed for navigational error or for an extra run over the target. Entire IAF was airborne to hit hard the numerically superior Egypt Air Force in the initial hours of the air battle, Because the survival of the Israel was at stake!
The IAF s’ High Command had left behind only twelve Mirage-IIIs for interception & air defence operations to safe guard Israel s’ airspace and its air bases & radars, eight were flying top cover, four were parked on the ORP at the end of the runway.
ECM units of IAF against EAF s’ radar stations were deliberately not operated before 0745 on Monday morning as the stealth operations might well have given the enemy air force advanced warning that something was up there. IAF s’ ECM units played well with EAF s’ High Powered Early Warning & Surveillance Radar Network of 23 units of Russian three dimension radar P-35s around Egypt, flapping with big ears.
The attacking force in formations of four aircraft made their way by various routes some by a short circular right hook over the sea to the EAF s air bases around Cairo, the Suez Canal and in Sinai. Other headed straight across to attack the enemy air bases in upper delta.
The strike force jets flew at very low level not more than 70-100 feet above ground or sea level, so as to remain beneath the EAF High Powered Early Warning & Surveillance Radars and SAMs batteries around airbases.
Prior to the first pre-emptive air strike by the enemy Air Force, On the other end EAF s’ air bases were witnessing an overwhelming calm and silence, then an uproar of returning MIG-21s descending to land on the runways broke the silence for time being, then coming to parking area.
Long before the complete silence descended over the air base, A high speed formation of four delta wing aircraft swooped in flying at tree top level to pulled up to 5000-6000 feet above the air base before turning for dive bombing attack angles. The 500 lbs & 1000 lbs specific purpose built bombs began hit hard the runways, taxiways and culvert dropped by the attacking jets, the bombs scored wonderful, blinding, bursting hits, bang on the targets. The aiming accuracy and precision was above the board. Enemy had pulverized the EAF s’ personnel particularly fighter pilots and air defence commanders on the air bases with shock and surprise around 0910 AM Cairo time, when chances of surprise air strike were out of consideration.
Then attacking jets turned towards ORP and parking area to began repeated strafing runs against enemy aircraft. The EAF s’ MIG-21 & 19s & SU-7s aircraft parked on the airbases proved to be sitting ducks and fell prey to the enemy Air Force s’ attacking formation. The IAF s’ formations delivering delayed fused bombs over the targets with pinpoint accuracy shocking the enemy Egypt air force with surprise and agony , leaving behind a trail of smoke and fire engulfing enemy air bases with 7-8 minutes duration.
Although EAF s’ SAMs units fired a number of SA-2 missiles against low level attacking IAF s’ jets, but failed to hit any attacking jet during the air strikes over air bases. Ack Ack batteries also could not engaged and hit enemy jets with in timely accurate firing, because enemy air force hit hard EAF s’ around ten major air bases by achieving complete surprise and pulverizing them with low level bombing and strafing accurately right on the targets.
About eight formations of EAF s’ MIG-21s were destroyed, while taxing to the end of the runways, whereas twelve MIG-21s & eight Mig-19s heading to the air bases near Canal during mid stream of the IAF s’ air strike, found no runways to land also fell prey to the enemy s’ attacking fighter bombers.
However, the EAF s’ two formations of four MIG-21s were able to get airborne for timely interception and succeeded in shooting down two IAF s’ jets, before they themselves were shot down.
A training formation of four MIG-21s aircraft flown by one instructor and three student pilots was already airborne, when IAF s’ air strike force went in while, major part of the Egypt Air Force was caught on the ground.
Each air strike against EAF s’air base was made by a formation of four fighter bomber flying in two pairs, every aircraft pair struck its target, carried out its operational mission exactly as planned and every bomb exploded on the target as reported by the pilots. Nine out ten enemy air bases were precisely hit at the same time, the tenth Fayid air base was attacked a few minutes later, as it was still covered by the morning mist over the Suez Canal.
The IAF had devised and perfected the specific purpose bombs for destroying the runways. As soon as the bomb leaves the aircraft a retro-rocket is fired to stop its forward impetus. Then a booster rocket drives it into the runway. Once it has penetrated the concrete a time fuse explodes it. The fuse may be instantaneous or may be set on a variable time-delay. The runways are considered easy to repair, but is more dangerous when the runway kept exploding.
A pair of Mirage-IIIs destroyed EAF s’ sixteen TU-16s bombers on the ground through dive bombing making several runs within four to six minutes before returning from mission. The attacking jets destroyed original combat aircraft and dummy mock-up under camouflage cover untouched, because Moss ad s’ intelligence network provided them accurate on-line positions of EAF s’ deployment in the air bases.
Altogether 19 EAF s’ air bases & 23 radar stations were hit by the IAF on 5th June, 1967. The Counter air operation was completed before afternoon. It was estimated about 100 pilots of the EAF were killed during the first day air strikes and subsequently EAF s’ 309 front fighter bomber aircraft including bomber force of all TU-16s, ground equipments, ammunition dumps, runways including 23 radar stations with number of SAM batteries in the first two days of the air war with IAF were either completely or partially destroyed. In the first two days of air war, the IAF logged more than 1000 operational sorties, around 500 sorties per day.
For about 80 minutes counter air operation with any let up the IAF kept attacking the EAF s’ air bases, then after a 10-15 minutes interval, there followed a further 80 minutes of air strikes. In total , 2 hours & 50 minutes the IAF destroyed the offensive punch of the EAF and effectively broken its as a formidable fighting force to challenge the IAF in the air.
El-Arish the major EAF s’ air base located in Sinai was attacked by hitting enemy aircraft there, but its runways were not targeted, since Israeli war plan called for its utilization as forward staging, supply and casualty evacuation air base. Therefore by the Tuesday evening it was in the operational use by the IAF.
By 1035 hours Tel Aviv time & 1135 hours Cairo time on the Monday 5th June, 1967 The numerically superior Egypt Air Force had been destroyed on the airfields, with out launching for any major air battle with the arch enemy the IAF. It had no longer constituted an effective fighting force and thereby unable to provide air defence operations and air support missions for the Egyptian Army deployed in the Sinai.
General Hod counted on having a couple of hours had start in which to deal with the EAF before having to cope with those of Jordan Air Force, Syria Air Force and the Iraq Air Force.
Jordan Air Force, Syria Air Force and the Iraq Air Force.
On the Monday morning, the Syrian Air Force bombed oil refinery in Haifa and made air strike against IAF s’ air base Megiddo successfully destroying few aircraft. Whereas, the IAF retaliated by attacking Syrian air bases located around Damascus by targeting aircraft on the ground.
Jordan Air Force s’ Hawker Hunters successfully attacked IAF s’ air base Kefer Sirkin, destroying some cargo transport aircraft there. When, the IAF s’ 6 Mystere-IV attacked the major air base Mafraq. A formation of Jordan Air Force s’ Hawker Hunters scrambled to intercept the enemy in the air led by Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam SJ a decorated star of the PAF; in the ensuing aerial combat Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam shot down one of the Mystere and extensively damaging another aircraft. His wing man Lt. Ihsan Shurdom also successfully shot one Mystere during the battle, surviving lucky Israeli pilots fled back. Meanwhile, the numerically superior IAF s’ fighter bomber formations after formation kept bombing Mafraq & Amman air bases, putting them out of action together with Jordan radar station located at Ajlun by logging 51 operational sorties in a day. However, the small size valiant Jordan Air Force virtually been knocked out after putting gallant air battle Vs numerically superior enemy Israel Air Force.
Iraq Air Force s’ TU-16s bombers attacked Israeli town Natanya, one bomber was shot down by the IAF s’ interceptor aircraft. The IAF s’ Vautours bombers & Mirage-IIIs made air strike against Iraqi air base located at H-3. A formation of four Iraq Air Force s’ Hawker Hunters led by PAF s’ Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam along with wing man Lt. Ihsan Shurdom , Lt Samir & Lt. Muhammad scrambled to challenge attacking IAF s’ jets over the base.
Leader Saif keeping the traditional courage and professionalism of the PAF s’ falcons alive by shooting down enemy hi-tech aircraft Mirage-III and then Vautours bomber during this swift and decisive air battle with the IAF. His wing man Lt.Ihsan also shot down one Vautours bomber. Valiant youngest Iraqi Air Force s’ Lt. Muhammad embraced shahadat fighting against enemy Air Force.
The IAF s’ numerically superior force counter air operation against H-3 air base proved to be ill fated mission, surviving lucky Israeli pilots fled back to tell the horrible tale of aborted mission against a highly professional & dedicated formation of hawker hunters led by Flt.Lt. Saif ul Azam. One of the biggest operational loss of the IAF during the air battle of June, 1967.,the IAF s’ Chief General Hod acknowledged this aerial encounter over Iraqi air base H-3 that critique of H-3 fiasco made him feel almost as if he had lost the air war.
So the PAF s’ lone fighting falcon Flt Lt. Saif ul Azam emerged the highest decorated star of air battles with numerically super enemy air force by shooting down highest number of enemy aircraft in June 1967 Arabs Israel war.
Net Operational Losses of Arabs Israel air war of June, 1967
Net Losses by the IAF : 40 Combat aircraft & 6 trainer aircraft
Vs
Net Losses by the Egypt Air Force : 309 Combat aircraft & 4 trainer aircraft
Net Losses by the Syrian Air Force : 60 Combat aircraft & trainer aircraft
Net Losses by the Jordan Air Force : 29 Combat aircraft
Net Losses by the Iraq Air Force : 17 Combat aircraft
Net Losses by the Lebanon Air Force : 1 Combat aircraft
Final Analysis & Critique about Air War of June, 1967
The “Operation Moked” was extraordinarily success and led to a sensational and dramatic victory for the Israel Air Force. Since morning 0845 A.M within 2 hours & 50 minutes the IAF destroyed the offensive punch of the EAF by targeting 309 combat aircraft & radars and effectively broken its as a formidable fighting force to challenge the IAF in the air and subsequently dealing with the other Arab Air Forces was side show.
Field Marshal Amer in the Egypt Army Headquarters Cairo, tried to piece a new war plan from the wreckage of the Egyptian Air Force. He ordered the Air Marshal Mahmood to launch the Air Force to hit back the Israelis, but the reply he received was that the little that remained of the EAF was unable to carry out any meaningful air operations.
Even Egypt s’ President Nasser was later to complained. “They (IAF s’ air strikes) came from the Western direction; he said when we expected them to come from the Eastern direction.” Because the Egypt Air Defence s’ SAMs & AAA batteries were pointed towards the Eastern sides.
King Hussain of Jordan was informed by Egyptian Marshal Amer in the early hours of 5th June telling lies, keeping him in darkness about the material ground realities of the air war ‘s outcome; “Approximately 75% of the Israel Air Force s’ aircraft have been destroyed or put out of action by the EAF. UAR s’ troops have engaged the enemy and taken the offensive on the grounds.”
President Nasser also had called to King Hussain telling lies. “ We have sent all our combat aircraft against Israel. Since early this morning our Air Force is bombing the IAF s’ airfields.”
As the above Telephonic conversations were intercepted and recorded by the Israeli Intelligence Agency “Moss ad.” Later on its tape recorded version was released to International Media & Press.
Since, President Nasser already knew that his Air Force was totally been destroyed in the pre-emptive air strikes carried out by the IAF.
The Syrians’ President and Air Force s’ Chief General Hafiz ul Asad sensed dangerous military scenario leading to ultimate military defeat, after perceiving the fateful end of the Egypt Air Force and the Jordan Air Force by the IAF, refused to provide air support for the Jordanian Army requested by King Hussain against the Israeli Army ; “All our aircraft were on training missions and not a single aircraft was available.”
Whereas, Egyptian Air Force s’ Command & Control s’ lacked of foresight ness, vision and professionalism at higher, mid and lower levels, Therefore part of the Israel Air Force s’ stunning victory resulted from the recklessness, blind folly and ineptitude of the Egypt s’ bankrupt political –military leadership at the helms of affairs.
Army rule under the Military Rulers Col. Nasser after General Neguib in Egypt, destroyed the integral fabric of professionalism, system criteria and merit among the Air Force, the Army and the Navy; Political appointees & blue eyed mediocre cadres promoted to led the Air Force, thereby denying professional, moral and social ethics and norms.
Same Political situation also prevailed in Iraq & Syria due to the Army rulers, destroyed the integral fabric of professionalism, system criteria and merit among the Air Force, the Army and the Navy; Political appointees & blue eyed mediocre cadres promoted to led the Air Force, thereby denying professional, moral and social ethics and norms.
The Arab Air Forces in the above Arab countries became the tool of elite ruling Military Junta rather to be the razor sharp air war machines every ready to fight the war with Enemy Israel Air Force.
Israel Air Force s’ Chief General Hod stated the following reasons for the classical air battle of June, 1967:-
Sixteen years of Air War Planning had gone into those initial 90 minutes. The planning was prepared on professional and technical grounds, up dated and perfected constantly in accordance with Strategic, Operational and Tactical requirement/Military Doctrine of the Israel.
Intelligence gathering & Analysis of enemy Air Forces and operational activities covering the exact location and details of the enemy air bases; the precise details of combat aircraft, radar and missile batteries deployment positions was accurate and real time information/data was receiving from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan through “Moss ad” s’ agents network very active in Government circles of Egypt and Syria. The latest data/information was timely processed and promptly reported to the IAF for air war operations. Otherwise, military situation might had been different.
Operational Control: The ability to absorb and integrate with existing air war plan, latest data/information as it received in and to reported fresh data/information and assigning new targets to the IAF s’ pilots in the air played a very vital part in the success of the air war operations.
The Successful Execution of the Air War Plan by the IAF s’ pilots was a very vital link in the chain of success. It reflected number of years of rigorous training-in flying, navigation, gunnery and bombing precision.
Fastest Turn Around Time played a key factor in achieving the desired results in the air war.
Service & Maintenance of the combat aircraft was also a key factor in achieving the desired results in the air war.
The Air War Plan “Operation Moked” by the IAF had been conceived on the basis that time frame would be short, therefore Israel Military Victory would have to be achieved as swift and decisive as possible.
The High Command of the IAF had thorough and accurate appreciation of its numerically superior enemy Egypt Air Force as well other Air Forces and its capabilities and operational limitations in terms of war & peace. This key factor proved to be the ultimate secret of the lightning air victory of Israel.
The political leadership of Israel s’ Prime Minister Eshkol and Defence Minister General Moshe Dayan professionally acknowledged the paramount significance of its Air Force by providing fee hand to General Hod and Brigadier General Weizmann to contemplate and launch the pre emptive air strikes against its key enemy Egypt Air Force on priority and subsequently other Arab Air Forces, the entire military planning of the Israel Army against enemy Arab Armies was heavily depended upon successful air superiority through counter air operations by the IAF.
Bibliography
1. The Six Day War by: Randolph S/ & Winston S. Churchill
2. Israel s’ Wars 1947-93 by: Ahron Bregman
3. NEWSWEEK, New York, USA.
4. TIMES INTERNATIONAL,New York, USA.
5. The Art of Blitzkrieg by: Charles Messenger
6. Many National & International Newspapers
7. The Story of the Pakistan Air Force by Shaheen Foundation,Islamabad.
